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APOLOGY EXCEPTED:
INCORPORATING A FEMINIST
ANALYSIS INTO EVIDENCE
POLICY WHERE YOU
WOULD LEAST EXPECT IT
Aviva Orenstein*

I.

INTRODUCTION

"Some persons hold," he pursued, still hesitating, "that there is a
wisdom of the Head, and that there is a wisdom of the Heart. I
have not supposed it so; but, as I have said, I mistrust myself now. I
have supposed the head to be all-sufficient. It may not be all-sufficient; how can I venture this morning to say it is!"
-Charles Dickens1
Evidence law derives from a combination of logic, policy, tradition, and historical anomaly. Many have observed that the law of evidence is based on concepts of relevance and fairness that seem
* Associate Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law, Bloomington. I wish to
thank the following people for their assistance, support, and good advice: Rabbi Debby Orenstein, Professors Roger Park, Myrna Raeder, Andrew Taslitz, and all those who participated in
that informal "ideas lunch" convened at Indiana School of Law, Bloomington to discuss this
topic, especially Hannah Buxbaum, Seth Lahn, Lauren Robel, and Susan Williams. Special
thanks also to Ruthie Cohen, Madi Hirschland, Jessica Mott, and David Szonyi, whose good
editing is only surpassed by their deep friendship. I appreciate the research assistance of Erika
Schneider, Heather DeCoursey, Dorie Hertzel, and Tabitha Tyle. I apologize to my wonderful
secretary, Terry Kaczmarek, who has typed multiple drafts and is sorry that she ever laid eyes on
it. Obviously, all mistakes are my own.
Finally, I wish to dedicate this Article to my grandmother, Libby Mowshowitz, of blessed
memory, who passed away June 11, 1998, 17 Sivan 5758. In a letter dated December 19, 1993,
which she left for her children to be read upon her death, she wrote: "I don't claim any other
accomplishment in my life except for my two children. I hope I go soon before I give you much
more trouble. I apologize if I don't." She lived a rich life, with humor, dignity, meaningful
friendships, and a keen sense of social responsibility. My grandmother apologized often, almost
reflexively, but rarely was ever at fault. As a peacemaker and social conscience, she was an
inspiration. She will be deeply missed.
1. CHAR.n DIcKENs, HARD Tmas 199-200 (J. M. Dent & Sons, Ltd. 1979) (1907).
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remarkably unreflective. 2 As part of that intellectual self-satisfaction,
the FederalRules of Evidence exude confidence that the rules are neutral and rational, and as such, most likely to achieve fair and socially
useful results.

In this Article, I offer a feminist critique to challenge the Federal
Rules' so-called objectivity and neutrality. In Part II, I apply a feminist analysis to argue that the evidence rules are not neutral or objective, nor could they ever be. Even where the rules of evidence do not
claim to be relying on or transmitting values, they nevertheless do so.
The Rules purport to elevate logic over emotion. I suggest that the
"logic" embedded in evidence rules is laden with cultural biases and
that emotion, if properly understood, has a legitimate role to play in
crafting evidence policy. In addition, as a practical matter, the rules
may discriminate against the cognitive and linguistic styles of women

and other subordinate groups.
My focus is on evidence rules that avowedly and unabashedly
promote extrinsic policies. In Part III, I briefly consider two such evidence rules: Rule 407, which prohibits evidence of remedial repair,3
and Rule 408, which prohibits evidence of compromise or offer to
compromise.4 These two rules articulate social goods, aspire to social

goals, and inevitably reflect assumptions about human behavior. The
policies underlying these rules, though interesting and defensible, are
not self-evident and certainly not neutral. They reflect cultural values

and presumptions, rather than human truths.
2. See, e.g., Michael L. Seigel, A Pragmatic Critique of Modern Evidence Scholarship, 88
Nw. U. L. REv. 995, 995-96 (1994).
3. Rule 407 provides:
When, after an event, measures are taken which, if taken previously, would have made
the event less likely to occur, evidence of the subsequent measures is not admissible to
prove negligence or culpable conduct in connection with the event. This rule does not
require the exclusion of evidence of subsequent measures when offered for another
purpose, such as proving ownership, control, or feasibility of precautionary measures, if
controverted, or impeachment.
FED. R. EVID. 407.

4. Rule 408 provides:
Evidence of (1) furnishing or offering or promising to furnish, or (2) accepting or offering or promising to accept, a valuable consideration in compromising or attempting to
compromise a claim which was disputed as to either validity or amount, is not admissible to prove liability for or invalidity of the claim or its amount. Evidence of conduct
or statements made in compromise negotiations is likewise not admissible. This rule
does not require the exclusion of any evidence otherwise discoverable merely because
it is presented in the course of compromise negotiations. This rule also does not require exclusion when the evidence is offered for another purpose, such as proving bias
or prejudice of a witness, negativing a contention of undue delay, or proving an effort
to obstruct a criminal investigation or prosecution.
FED. R. EVID. 408.
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In Part IV, I propose a new evidence rule, the apology exception.
Like Rules 407 and 408, my proposed rule would apply in civil cases.5
My proposed rule would serve as an exception to the general principle
that statements by party-opponents are admissible at trial.6 Generally, such statements are deemed admissions and are admissible despite their hearsay status.7 Like Rules 407 and 408, my proposed
exception to the party admissions rule arises from suppositions about
human nature and the related policy analysis of how to influence behavior through the evidence rules. My proposed apology doctrine,
however, reflects a different view of human psychology. It does not
derive exclusively from the highly rationalistic, arid wisdom of the
"head." Instead, my proposal also relies on wisdom of the "heart." It
emanates from feminist values that are concerned with power, relationships, and finding practical contextual solutions to social
problems. Even apologies that originate from self-protection, which
are not entirely sincere or fully contrite, serve a vital social purpose. I
posit that apologies are especially important for subordinate groups,
who often feel unnoticed, and whose wrongs have gone unacknowledged. In addition, my interest in applying a feminist analysis is
sparked because arguably women are disproportionately inclined to
apologize and may suffer the legal consequences of the use of their
apology as an admission against them.
Finally, in Part V, I apply the proposed apology exception to the
specific problem of doctors who commit medical errors. Feminist insights into power differentials and feminist advocacy of an ethic of
5. But cf. DAVID LEONARD, THE NEW WIGMORE: SELECTED RULES OF LIMITED ADMISSI§ 2.2, at 2:3-2:4 (Richard D. Friedman ed., Supp. 1999) (noting that Rule 407 could technically arise in a criminal case in which "negligence or culpable conduct" is an issue).
6. Rule 801(d)(2) provides:
Admission by party-opponent. The statement is offered against a party and is (A) the
party's own statement, in either an individual or a representative capacity or (B) a
statement of which the party has manifested an adoption or belief in its truth, or (C) a
statement by a person authorized by the party to make a statement concerning the
subject, or (D) a statement by the party's agent or servant concerning a matter within
the scope of the agency or employment, made during the existence of the relationship,
or (E) a statement by a coconspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of
the conspiracy. The contents of the statement shall be considered but are not alone
sufficient to establish the declarant's authority under subdivision (C), the agency or
employment relationship and scope thereof under subdivision (D), or the existence of
the conspiracy and the participation therein of the declarant and the party against
whom the statement is offered under subdivision (E).
BILITY

FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(2).

7. As out-of-court statements used to prove the truth of the matter asserted, such apologies would fit the definition of hearsay (e.g., "Sorry I ran the stop sign, to prove that the declarant ran the stop sign"). See FED. R. EVID. 801(a)-(c) (defining a hearsay statement, declarant,
and hearsay itself).
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care support the need for an apology exception in medical malpractice
cases. My proposal would allow doctors to be forthcoming, and encourage patients to trust their doctors and feel valued by them. Disclosure and apology are imperative for a patient's physical, emotional,
and spiritual health; they are beneficial for a doctor as well. Society
benefits when doctors can face their mistakes and learn from them.
We all benefit from less litigation and more supportive interaction,
including forgiveness.
II.

A

FEMINIST CRITIQUE OF EVIDENCE LAW

Feminist analyses of evidentiary law have focused primarily on
rape law because disrespect and disbelief of the rape survivor in the
courtroom beg for feminist analysis and concern.8 But feminist analysis of evidence need not stop there. Feminists are interested in the
subtle biases and preferences in the law. Evidence law, with its concerns about relevance and credibility, is an exciting subject for feminist analysis. 9
Evidence law has been called optimistic'°-I believe it borders
on smug-in its faith in rationalism. The FederalRules of Evidence"2
have departed in some respects from the common law of evidence'
8. See generally, e.g., Kathy Mack, ContinuingBarriers to Women's Credibility: A Feminist
Perspective on the Proof Process, 4 CRIM. L.F. 327 (1993) (focusing on the "particular problem
facing women who testify about rape-the need for corroboration"-and describing barriers to
women's credibility in courtroom settings by "drawing on social-psychological research and task
force reports on gender bias in the courts"). Interesting work has also been done on spouse
abuse evidence. See generally Myrna S. Raeder, The Admissibility of Prior Acts of Domestic
Violence: Simpson and Beyond, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1463 (1996); Martha R. Mahoney, Exit:
Power and the Idea of Leaving in Love, Work, and the Confirmation Hearings,65 S. CAL. L. REV.
1283 (1992).
9. See, e.g., Mack, supra note 8, at 331 (discussing women's problems in gaining respect
and credibility in the courtroom by drawing on psychological research and gender task force
reports); Rosemary C. Hunter, Gender in Evidence: Masculine Norms vs. Feminist Reforms, 19
HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 127, 127 (1996) (exploring uestions of credibility and relevance, the author
argues that "[c]ourts must first allow women's stories into evidence, and then they must take
these stories seriously").
10. See WILLIAM TWINING, RETHINKING EVIDENCE 75 (1990).
11. The Federal Rules of Evidence, adopted in 1975, have been around now for over twenty
years; only recently, with the appointment of an advisory committee overseeing the rules, have
we seen a move toward updating and making changes. See Edward R. Becker & Aviva Orenstein, The Federal Rules of Evidence After Sixteen Years-The Effect of "Plain Meaning" Jurisprudence, the Need for an Advisory Committee on the Rules of Evidence, and Suggestions for
Selective Revision of the Rules, 142 F.R.D. 519, 521 (1992).
12. Some examples are: the Federal Rules are less restrictive of opinion evidence. See FED.
R. EVID. 701 (allowing lay opinion testimony that is rationally based on perception and helpful
to the trier of fact). Expert scientific testimony is now governed by a rule of reliability instead of
the older Frye test. See FED. R. EVID. 702; Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579,
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and tend to favor admissibility. 3 Nevertheless, the Federal Rules
have perpetuated most of the common law's prevailing
policies, as
14
well as its focus on logic and suspicion of emotion.
For instance in its commentary to Rule 403, the Advisory Committee's Note specifically explains that "'[u]nfair prejudice' within its
context means an undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper
basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one."' 5 Evidence law is premised on the notion that the grand tradition of AngloAmerican courtroom procedure-blessed by history, enhanced by
logical analysis, hampered in part by pesky juries-will reach the right
result in deciding evidence questions. The result is not held up as ob-

jective truth (few claim that anymore), but a respectable cousin: a
reasonable resolution to end the dispute arrived at through neutral
rules that treat everyone equally and allow for fair administration of
justice. 6

A feminist critique points out the fallacy in this naive and sometimes willfully blind belief in the neutrality of evidence rules. Feminist
method "identif[ies] the gender implications of rules and practices
587, 590 (1993); cf Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (providing for the
admission of scientific evidence that has "acquired general acceptance in the particular field in
which it belongs"). Conspiracy need not be proved entirely by independent evidence to qualify a
statement as a coconspirator's admission. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E). The rules also provide a residual exception to the hearsay rule. See FED. R. EvIo. 807 (allowing the admission of
certain hearsay statements that have "circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness"). Moreover,
the Federal Rules' version of the best evidence rule is not preoccupied with locating the original
document, and in many cases will permit the admission of a copy. See FED. R. EvID. 1004
(allowing the admission of a copy where an original is lost, destroyed, not obtainable, in the
possession of the opponent, or relates to a collateral matter in the case).
13. Rule 402 provides: "All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided
by the Constitution of the United States, by Act of Congress, by these rules, or by other rules
prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority. Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible." FED. R. EvID. 402. See generally Edward J. Imwinkelreid, Federal Rule
of Evidence 402: The Second Revolution, 6 REv. LITIG. 129 (1987).
14. See, e.g., Hunter, supra note 9, at 129-30, 158 ("The rules of evidence clearly embody
Enlightment epistemology. They privilege fact over value, reason over emotion, presence over
absence, physical over psychological perceptions." (citations omitted)).
15. FED. R. EvID. 403 advisory committee's note.
16. Cf. FED. R. EVID. 102 (advocating the fair administration of justice as one purpose of
the Federal Rules, along with the ascertainment of truth); cf. also Thomas M. Mengler, The
Theory of Discretion in the FederalRules of Evidence, 74 IOWA L. REv. 413,414 (1989). Mengler
opined that:
The drafters believed that the trial process itself and the traditional rules of evidence
are imperfect tools in getting at the truth of a particular controversy ....
All things
considered, trial procedures, including evidentiary rules, provide litigants with an acceptably fair means for resolving their disputes. But few believe-least of all the drafters of the Federal Rules-that detailed evidence rules can be devised which, if
mechanically applied, would be appropriate for every controversy.
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which might otherwise appear to be neutral or objective."17 By applying feminist method we can examine how evidence rules are gendered,
that is to say, how the rules reflect the sexual power and social dynamics in our culture, how women may be underrepresented in the evidence rules, and how women's insights may be ignored.18
As outsiders-in legal culture, as well as the culture at largewomen have a unique perspective to offer. This perspective is fairly
easy to imagine when the subject is rape law. I hope, however, to

demonstrate the relevance of feminist analysis to rules that appear
neutral and to propose changes arising from those insights.19
There is no one feminist approach, and feminist scholarship often
identifies various and sometimes contradictory branches of thought.
"Difference feminism" emphasizes that a woman's "voice" is different
from that of a man's. 20 Without necessarily claiming that all women
are naturally or essentially different from all men, difference feminists
draw generalized distinctions between the genders, noting that women
tend to value personal relationships and seek connection with other
people, relying on "webs of interconnectedness." 21 Difference femi-

nism holds that women prefer consensus rather than hierarchy and
17. Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods [1990], in FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY:
371 (Katharine T. Bartlett & Rosanne Kennedy eds., 1991).
Bartlett set out a method for feminist analysis that is designed to "reveal features of a legal issue
which more traditional methods tend to overlook or suppress." Id.
18. See, e.g., Marilyn MacCrimmon, A Forum on Lavallee v. R.: Women and Self-Defence,
25 U.B.C. L. REV. 23, 36 (1991) (examining the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Lavallee
and how the rules of evidence law fail "to take into account experiences that differ from the
dominant view of human behaviour" and how this may contribute to the silencing of women).
19. See Kit Kinports, Evidence Engendered, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 413, 430-52 (1991).
Kinports's article is among the first to avowedly attempt a feminist critique of evidence offering
insights into how the evidence rules may ignore the experiences of women and instead reflect
male values and norms. See id.
20. See generally CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY
AND WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT (1982) (discussing the differences between how men and women
reason morally and consider relationships). Difference feminists reject a parity based approach
aimed solely at encouraging gender-blindness, arguing that formal equal treatment can be
hollow if it does not respect the real-life different experiences of women. See, e.g., Carrie
Menkel-Meadow, Feminist Legal Theory, Critical Legal Studies, and Legal Education or "The
Fem-Crits Go to Law School," 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 61, 72-73 (1988) (discussing the Supreme
Court's so-called equality of treating "pregnant persons" differently from "non-pregnant persons"). See generally Robin L. West, The Difference in Women's Hedonic Lives: A Phenomenological Critique of Feminist Legal Theory, 3 Wis. WOMEN'S L.J. 81 (1987).
21. Leslie Bender, A Lawyer's Primeron Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 3,
28-30 (1988) (discussing the work of Carol Gilligan); see also Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a
Different Voice: Speculations on a Women's Lawyering Process, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 39,
40 (1985) (summarizing psychological and sociological research that "has postulated that women
grow up in the world with a more relational and affiliational concept of self than do men").
READINGS IN LAW AND GENDER
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status. 22 Women distrust abstract, rights-based argument and, instead,
prefer context-based decisionmaking.2 3
Dominance feminists focus on disparities in power, rather than
style, ethic, or ways of thinking. These feminists analyze women's
place in society by examining male subjugation of women, focusing
particularly on sex. 24 They believe that women's subjugation stems
not merely from discrimination or society's failure to appreciate women's unique roles and perspectives. 25 Rather, dominance feminists
believe oppression of women stems from threats to women's safety
and physical integrity.2 6
Postmodernist feminism rejects the notion that gender is natural
or fixed.27 Postmodernist feminism does not accept identity as fixed,
22. See generally Kinports, supra note 19, at 419, 423 (offering a feminist critique of evidence rules as formal, abstract, overly complex, and hierarchical). See also Carol M. Rose, Women and Property: Gaining and Losing Ground, 78 VA. L. REV. 421, 428 (1992) (applying game
theory to the question of why women acquire less property than men, and postulating that women have "a greater taste for cooperation").
23. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 21, at 48 (observing that "[m]en focus on universal
abstract principles like justice, equality and fairness so that their world is safe, predictable and
constant. Women solve problems by seeking to understand the context and relationships involved and understand that universal rules may be impossible"); see also MARTHA MINOW,
MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN LAW 193 (1990) (stating that "[b]y grounding concern for relationships in the social and historical experience of women, feminist studies in many fields avoid floating abstractions and help to articulate and sustain
value judgements amid the challenges of relativism").
24. See Kathryn Abrams, Sex War Redux: Agency and Coercion in Feminist Legal Theory,
95 COLUM. L. REV. 304, 304 n.1 (1995) (describing dominance feminism as "that strand of feminist (legal) theory that locates gender oppression in the sexualized domination of women by men
and the erotization of that dominance through pornography and other elements of popular
culture").
25. See, e.g., Lisa R. Pruitt, A Survey of Feminist Jurisprudence,16 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK
L.J. 183, 198 (1994). Dominance theory is also influenced by marxism's focus on economic
differences, noting that women's lack of political power reflects their dependent economic status.
See id. at 197 (noting that Catharine MacKinnon, dominance feminism's "best known proponent," once analogized marxism to feminism). "MacKinnon opined that '[slexuality is to feminism what work is to marxism: that which is most one's own, yet most taken away."' Id. at 97 &
n.75 (quoting Catharine MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: An Agenda for
Theory, 7 SIGNS 515, 515 (1982)).
26. See, e.g., Catharine A. MacKinnon, Pornographyas Defamation and Discrimination,71
B.U. L. REV. 793, 796 (1991) ("Women remain reproductively colonized, subjected to systemic
physical and sexual insecurity and violation, and blamed for it.").
27. See John A. Powell, The Multiple Self: Exploring Between and Beyond Modernity and
Postmodernity, 81 MINN. L. REV. 1481, 1497 (1997); Nancy Levit, Feminism For Men: Legal
Ideology and the Constructionof Maleness, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1037, 1050 (1996) ("Femininity is
socially constructed, and knowledge, rather than consisting of objective, timeless truths, is situational and constructed from a confluence of multiple perspectives."). "By refusing to treat gender as if it were the 'truth' about men and women, the postmodern account focuses our attention
on the external forces, such as law, that construct gender." Note, PatriarchyIs Such a Drag: The
Strategic Possibilities of a Postmodern Account of Gender, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1973, 1974-75
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stable, or transparent, but instead as inherent.28 Postmodernist feminists focus particularly on the way legal language restricts women. 9
Using the literary tool of deconstruction, postmodernist feminists
rely on multiple reinterpretations to unsettle fixed notions of gender. 30 Because, according to postmodernist feminism, little is determinate or static, grand theorizing or all-encompassing solutions have
little utility. Postmodernist feminists, therefore, advocate pragmatic
and contextual solutions to social problems, despite their highly theoretical approach to gender issues. 3 '

Although obvious and sometimes deep conflicts exist among the
various branches of feminism, many of the tensions are at least amenable to common ground, if not entirely resolvable. For instance, the
theory of subordination that is central to dominance feminism can explain some of the origins of difference and connectedness. The skepticism of postmodern feminism encourages us to reject rigid stereotypes
and reminds us that all categories are socially constructed and that we
must be wary of declaring a tendency natural or fixed.
Despite significant differences in approaches, all three types of
feminism have in common certain basic principles. First is the desire
to eliminate subordination of women. Second, all feminists seek to
draw on women's practical experience as a source of knowledge and
power.32 Third, feminists of every stripe are suspicious of theories of
autonomy that do not account for interpersonal relationships. As Professor Martha Minow explained: "Feminists criticize the assumption
of autonomous individualism behind American economic and political
theory and legal and bureaucratic practice" because such an assumption "rests on a picture- of public and independent man rather than
(1995). Postmodern feminism also "emphasizes that there is no monolithic female experience,
but many experiences that vary according to a woman's race, class, ethnicity, and culture."
Levit, supra, at 1050.
28. See Susan H. Williams & David C. Williams, A Feminist Theory ofMalebashing,4 MICH.
J. GENDER & L. 35, 121-22 (1996) (describing postmodern feminism and the work of Mary Jo
Frug).
29. See id.
30. See id. at 123.
31. See Levit, supra note 27, at 1050.
32. See Bender, supra note 21, at 9 (describing the process of validated women's experience
and learning from them as consciousness raising); Patricia A. Cain, Feminist Jurisprudence:
Grounding the Theories [1990], in FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY: READINGS IN LAW AND GENDER
263, 263 (Katharine T. Bartlett & Rosanne Kennedy eds., 1991) (stating that "there does appear
to be general agreement that feminist method begins with the primacy of women's experience").
Additionally, Kit Kinports's first piece to avowedly attempt a feminist critique of evidence offered insights into how the evidence rules may ignore the experiences of women and instead
reflect male values and norms. See Kinports, supra note 19., at 430-52.
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private and often dependent, or interconnected, woman."33 Fourth,
feminists are constantly on the lookout for so-called neutral principles
or abstract values that camouflage support for patriarchy. Suspicion
of abstraction is more than just a different cognitive style; it arises
from the concern that abstractions "are likely to hide under claims of
universality what is in fact the particular point of view and experience
of those in power."3 4 For this reason all three schools of feminist analysis mentioned here would reject the notion of "neutral" evidence
rules and would instead examine how the rules affect women and perpetuate patriarchal values.3 "
III.

DISCUSSING

Two

CULTURALLY LADEN EVIDENCE RULES

Many evidence rules rely on policy judgments that in turn rely on
assessments of human nature. Once we have tasted from the tree of
knowledge and recognized the breadth and majesty of the rules, it is
hard to hide behind the fig leaf of neutrality. How can a set of rules
that makes assessments about a witness's propensity to be dishonest,36
or a rule that predicts jurors' reaction to the fact of insurance 37 be
culturally neutral? Feminism notices the inherent nonneutrality of
these issues and questions the assumptions about human nature on
which evidence policy relies. My focus here is on two highly policyladen rules: Rule 407, which prohibits evidence of remedial measures
to show negligence; s and Rule 408, which excludes evidence of compromise or an offer to compromise.39
Both rules can be conceived as exceptions to the admissions doctrine,4 ° which is itself an exception to the hearsay rule. Admissions
technically fit within the definition of hearsay because they are out-ofcourt statements used to prove the truth of the matter asserted. 41 Ad33. MiNow, supra note 23, at 194.
34. Id. at 217.
35. See generally Susan H. Williams, Feminist Legal Epistemology, 8 BERKELEY WOMEN'S
L.J. 63 (1993).
36. See FED. R. EVID. 608(c) (allowing the use of character evidence for purposes of
impeachment).
37. See FED. R. EVID. 411 (precluding most uses of evidence pertaining to the existence of
liability insurance).
38. See FED. R. EVID. 407.

39. See FED. R. EVID. 408.
40. The admissions doctrine holds that any statement or action made by a party may be
used by his opponent as evidence. See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 254 (John W. Strong ed.,

4th ed. 1992) (quoting Rule 801(d)(2), "Admission By Party-Opponent").
41. This traditional common law statement of hearsay has been adopted by the Federal
Rules. See FED. R. EVID. 801(c).
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missions are nevertheless deemed "not hearsay" under the Federal
Rules.42 Under this evidence scheme, with few exceptions, whatever a
party says or does is admissible against that party.43
The theory behind the wide admissibility of admissions is complex. The admissions doctrine rests partly on the notion that many
(but certainly not all) admissions are contrary to the declarant's interest and hence likely to be trustworthy because people generally do not
say things contrary to their interests unless they happen to be true. 4
Another justification rests on a functional understanding of hearsay.
According to this theory, hearsay is grounded in the right to crossexamine; therefore, such admissions cannot be hearsay because one
cannot cross-examine oneself. 45 But by far the most persuasive rationale for why admissions are exempted from the general rule barring hearsay derives from the adversary system itself.46 Essentially,
the law of evidence reflects the adversarial nature and win-lose philosophy of courtroom proceedings. A party may introduce any evidence
deriving from the opposing party that in any way deviates from the
opposing party's current position. The statement itself is admissible,
although the party-opponent that made the admission is free to explain or disavow it.
FederalRules of Evidence 407 and 408 provide special exceptions

to the admissions doctrine. For highly self-conscious and clearly articulated reasons, the Federal Rules follow traditional evidence policy
of excepting certain statements or actions by party-opponents that
would otherwise be admissible as party-opponent admissions or as
some nonhearsay recognition of facts.
A.

Rule 407

Rule 407 provides that: "When, after an event, measures are
taken which, if taken previously, would have made the event less
likely to occur, evidence of the subsequent measures is not admissible
to prove negligence or culpable conduct in connection with the
42. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d) (defining some prior statements as "not hearsay").
43. See, e.g., ROGER C. PARK ET AL., EVIDENCE LAW 254-55 (1998). "As applied to individ-

ual admissions, the Federal Rule is very broad. Itmeans that any statement by a party, offered
by an opponent, overcomes the hearsay hurdle." Id. at 255.
44. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2) advisory committee's note.
45. See id.
46. See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 40, § 254, at 141 (discussing various rationales and concluding that "the most satisfactory justification of the admissibility of admissions is
that they are the product of the adversary system, sharing on a lower level the characteristics of
admissions in pleadings and stipulations").

1999]

APOLOGY EXCEPTED

event."4 7

The rationale for Rule 407 is three-fold. First, Rule 407

rests on notions of logical relevance; just because one improves something does not mean the item was broken before. The fact of repair
does not logically mandate that the prior condition was negligent or
dangerous.4 " Similarly, just because one offers to pay someone off,
does not mean that one did anything wrong. Or, as Baron Bramwell
argued, it is ridiculous to hold that "because the world gets wiser as it
gets older, therefore it was foolish before."4 9

The second rationale stems from a concern that a contrary rule
would penalize do-gooders, the diligent, and conscientious repairers.

As Professors Muller and Kirkpatrick explain: "It appears unseemly,
and it may be even unfair, to allow, as evidence offered against a person over his objection, proof that he reacted50 sensibly and constructively to the fact that an accident occurred.
But the main explanation behind Rule 407 is an administrative
and utilitarian rationale-we need these rules to encourage desirable

behavior outside the courtroom. The concern is that without the protection of Rule 407, defendants would hesitate to repair dangerous
conditions out of fear that such repair will be an admission of negli-

gence.5 ' As a Georgia appellate court explained in the 1995 case of
Studard v. Department of Transportation,52 "excluding such evidence

lies in sound public policy 'that men should be encouraged to improve,
or repair, and not be deterred from it by the fear that if they do so
their acts will be construed into an admission that they had been
47. FED. R. EVID. 407. Recently, Rule 407 has been amended to include product liability
cases and to clarify that it applies only to changes made after the occurrence or incident that gave
rise to suit. As Professor David Leonard has noted, many perceive subsequent remedial measures as admissions. See LEONARD, supra note 5, § 202. He argues, however, that such nomenclature is confusing because subsequent remedial measures are not intended as communicative
conduct and hence not hearsay at all. See id; see also FED. R. EVID. 801(a) (defining a "statement" as "an oral or written assertion" or "nonverbal conduct.., intended ...as an assertion").
Professor Leonard suggests instead describing them as a "recognition of fault." See LEONARD,
supra note 5, § 202, at 2:9. I agree with Professor Leonard that many actions that would qualify
as remedial measures are probably not hearsay at all. Nevertheless, the theories of relevance
and the policies behind the Rules pertaining to admissions and subsequent remedial measures
are closely related.
48. See FED. R. EvID. 407 advisory committee's note.

49. Hart v. Lancashire and Yorkshire Ry. Co., 21 L.T.R. N.S. 261, 263 (1869), quoted in
FED. R. EvID. 407 advisory committee's note.
50. 2 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 128, 30

(2d ed. 1994).
51. See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 40, § 267, at 200 ("The predominant reason

for excluding such evidence. . . is not lack of probative significance, but rather a policy against
discouraging the taking of safety measures.").
52. 466 S.E.2d 236 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995).
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wrongdoers. "'53 Rule 407 defines both what is socially desirable and
reflects its conception of human nature as to how to achieve that desired result. The presumption is that without Rule 407's exclusion of
remedial measures, people would allow dangerous conditions to persist in order to avoid admitting negligence. The rule assumes the prudent economic actor, who makes choices out of financial interest.
Indeed, Flaminio v. Honda Motor Company,5 4 an important opinion
by Judge Posner, construes Rule 407 in a product liability design defect case by using a law and economics analysis. The court stated:
[A]ccidents are low-probability events. The probability of another
accident may be much smaller than the probability that the victim of
the accident that has already occurred will sue the injurer and, if

permitted, will make devastating use at trial of any measures that
the injurer
may have taken since the accident to reduce the
55
danger.
Judge Posner reasoned that "if evidence of subsequent remedial measures is admissible to prove liability, the incentive to take such meas56
ures will be reduced.
Rule 407 posits a "sociopathic caricature" of the autonomous per5
son. 7 The actor conceptualized by Rule 407 is willing to let others be
injured rather than fix the problem, which might admit to a mistake
and expose him to contrary evidence in a tort action. The person postulated by the rule seems calculating and heartless. He possesses no
sense of empathy or connection with others who may be harmed in
the future. He is willing to sit back and let others be injured rather
than admit fault. He certainly is not one who has been socialized to
fix problems.
A feminist analysis would question the rationale for Rule 407,
observing that the underlying reasons for the rule are, at the very
least, debatable and incomplete both empirically and normatively. 8
53. Id. at 239 (quoting Georgia S.& F. Ry. Co. v. Cartledge, 42 S.E. 405, 407 (Ga. 1902))
(emphasis added). I emphasize the word "men," which was obviously not emphasized in the
original, to foreshadow my feminist analysis and prompt the reader to wonder whether women,
given their socialization and connectedness, would demand or require the protection of Rule 407
to correct a flaw or improve a condition.
54. 733 F.2d 463 (7th Cir. 1984).

55. Id. at 469.
56. Id. This reasoning is assailable on its own economic grounds because it ignores the
independent economic reasons manufacturers have to repair defects, such as avoiding other injuries and lawsuits.
57.
58.
human
(noting

ROBIN WEST, CARING FOR JUSTICE 5 (1997).
As with many evidence rules, Rule 407 is based, at least in part, on assertions about
nature that could be tested empirically. See LEONARD, supra note 5, § 2.4.1, at 2:29
that Rule 407 is "based on unverified motivational and behavioral assumptions"). To the
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Assuming, arguendo, that people know about the rule 59 (and only sophisticated, repeat players necessarily will), there are other reasons to

doubt the logic or wisdom of Rule 407. For instance, from a pragmatic
standpoint many manufacturers have independent reasons to repair
defective products, such as fear of future suits or loss of good reputation. An analysis from an ethic of care, however, would dispute the
underlying assumption that economic self-interest would be the sole
motivation in a person's decision whether to repair a dangerous
condition.
Rule 407 is certainly not all bad, particularly because it does reward those who do repair-whether they knew of the rule or not. My
feminist critique is aimed more at the rationale than the rule. Rule
407 is emblematic of the assessments of human nature underlying the
rules of evidence generally, which tend to be arid, incomplete, and
tendentious. Failure to recognize the human impulse to repair or re-

mediate is typical of the bias of our evidence rules, which, even when
overtly attempting to shape human behavior, demonstrates a very
constricted view of how people think and act. The evidence rules'
narrow, ungenerous, and almost brutish conception of human behavior ignores certain groups or certain types of interactions.
B. Rule 408

Rule 408 follows the traditional common law rule promoting
compromises-excluding evidence of an offer or fact of compromise
in order to prove fault.' Additionally, Rule 408 provides that: "Eviextent that such psychological tests are possible, I agree wholeheartedly with David Faigman
that we should conduct such investigations, a point Professor Faigman made as a panelist at the
Association of American Law Schools' 1998 presentation on gender and race in evidentiary policy. For instance, examining the inclination to repair despite adverse financial consequences is a
worthwhile psychological project. I want to emphasize, however, that my critique is also normative and cultural, as well. I believe that a dynamic link connects legal rules and social values.
Therefore, even if all empirical evidence pointed to the correctness of Rule 407's assumptions
about human behavior, the rule would still be subject to a feminist critique.
59. See Leonard, supra note 5, § 2.4.1, at 2:26 (noting that the policy rationale behind Rule
407 is "built on the assumption that the party contemplating remedial measures is aware of the
exclusionary rule").
60. The language of the rule provides:
Evidence of (1) furnishing or offering or promising to furnish, or (2) accepting or offering or promising to accept, a valuable consideration in compromising or attempting to
compromise a claim which was disputed as to either validity or amount, is not admissible to prove liability for or invalidity of the claim or its amount.
FED. R. EVID. 408. This exclusion of evidence of compromise was first grounded in contract law
on the theory that compromise offers made with no consideration had no evidentiary weight.
See Fred S. Hjelmeset, Impeachment of Party by Prior Inconsistent Statement in Compromise
Negotiations: Admissibility Under FederalRule of Evidence 408, 43 CLEV. ST. L. REV.75, 86-87
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dence of conduct or statements made in compromise negotiations is
likewise not admissible."6 1 In this respect, Rule 408 provides a wider
net of protection and exclusion than did the common law. The common law only excluded the actual settlement offer, but not the surrounding statements, unless such statements were inextricably linked
to the offer, couched in hypothetical terms, or masked by the words
"without prejudice. '6 2 Rule 408 dispenses with such niceties (which
tended to protect those represented by counsel) and excludes not only
the offer, but all statements made during the course of the
negotiations.6 3
Like Rule 407, Rule 408 stems from an assessment of relevance,
concern for fairness to the parties, and extrinsic policy concerns. 64 To
a lesser extent, Rule 408 has also been justified on a privilege rationale. 65 As to relevance, the argument runs that just because a potential
defendant offers to settle a claim does not necessarily mean that the
defendant believes he is at fault or in fact is at fault. The defendant

could be a peacemaker, a generous spirit, a risk-averse person, or
(1995). This rationale was superceded by Lord Kenyon's justification that "men should be allowed to 'buy their peace."' Id. (citations omitted).
61.

FED. R. EVID. 408.

62. See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 40, § 266, at 466; Hjelmeset, supra note 60,

at 87; Note, Rule 408: Compromise and Offers to Compromise, 12 TouRo L. REV. 443, 443-44
(1995).
63. Rule 408 provides:
The mere fact that information was transmitted during a settlement negotiation does
not cover that piece of information in a blanket of secrecy. The actual disclosure during negotiations may not be admitted to prove fault, but facts otherwise discoverable
are still admissible. This rule does not require the exclusion of any evidence otherwise
discoverable merely because it is presented in the course of compromise negotiations.
This rule also does not require exclusion when the evidence is offered for another purpose, such as proving bias or prejudice of a witness, negativing a contention of undue
delay, or proving an effort to obstruct a criminal investigation or prosecution.
FED. R. EVID. 408. See generally Kristina M. Kerwin, The Discoverability of Settlement and ADR
Communications: Federal Rule of Evidence 408 and Beyond, 12 REV. LITIG. 665 (1993) (noting
that Rule 408 poses some recurrent problems such as the discoverability of compromise negotiations for the use in other proceedings); Hjelmeset, supra note 60 (the use of statements in negotiations to impeach a lying witness with his own prior statement). These questions, though
interesting, do not concern the analysis here.
64. Professor Leonard also discusses a discredited contract law rationale for Rule 408 by
which unenforceable offers or contracts were not considered competent evidence. See LEONARD, supra note 5, at § 3.3.1.
65. Some justify the rule as a quasi-privilege because it promotes confidential communication. See, e.g., Note, Making Sense of Rules of Privilege Under the Structural (Il)Logic of The
Federal Rules of Evidence, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1339, 1348 (1992) (referring to Rule 408 as an
"activity" privilege rule, which excludes extrinsic actions of the parties for reasons of public
policy). But because there is no special relationship between the parties, such as lawyer-client or
spouse-to-spouse, the analogy is weak.
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someone jealous of his reputation.66 Or, the defendant could have
calculated that the cost of litigation outweighs the cost of settlement.
None of these defendants believes in his culpability; some are indeed

faultless. From a relevance perspective, therefore, the offer to compromise is not particularly probative of fault.67
Obviously, however, the timing and amount of a compromise offer influence its relevance.6 8 A substantial offer to settle a case may
be probative of liability on the theory that no one would offer a substantial amount unless he thought his opponent possessed a valid
claim. If, despite self-interest and the natural human capacity for denial, a party thinks his opponent possesses a valid claim, his opponent
probably does. Given the low threshold of relevance under the Federal Rules of Evidence, it would be hard to argue that offers to compromise have no tendency to make the fact of fault at least slightly
more likely. 69 Therefore, a relevancy rationale is not sufficient to explain Rule 408.
As with Rule 407, another justification for Rule 408 arises from a
desire to reward goodness. We exclude compromises from evidence
in part because of fairness concerns. We do not want to punish the
"blessed peacemakers," and we affirmatively want to encourage potential litigants to be like Aaron, Moses's brother, "loving peace and
pursuing peace. 7 ° We certainly do not want to disadvantage individ66. According to the Advisory Committee, "[t]he evidence is irrelevant, since the offer may
be motivated by a desire for peace rather than from any concession of weakness of position."
FED. R. EVID. 408 advisory committee's note.
67. As Wigmore explained:
The true reason for excluding an offer of compromise is that it does not ordinarily
proceed from and imply a specific belief that the adversary's claim is well founded, but
rather a belief that the further prosecution of that claim, whether well founded or not,
would in any event cause such annoyance as is preferably avoided by the payment of
the sum offered. In short, the offer implies merely a desire for peace, not a concession
of wrong done ....
JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1061, at 36 (1972).

68. The Advisory Committee stated: "The validity of this position will vary as the amount
of the offer varies in relation to the size of the claim and may also be influenced by other circumstances." FED. R. EVID. 408 advisory committee's notes. McCormick on Evidence states:
The relevancy of the offer will vary according to circumstances, with a very small offer
of payment to settle a very large claim being much more readily construed as a desire
for peace rather than an admission of weakness of position. Relevancy would increase,
however, as the amount of the offer approaches the amount claimed.
MCCoRMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 40, § 266, at 194; see also LEONARD, supra note 5, at

§ 3.2.2 (discussing factors affecting the relevance and probative value of compromise evidence).
69. Rule 401 defines relevant evidence as "evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less
probable than it would be without the evidence." FED. R. EVID. 401.
70. RABBI MORRIS SCHATZ, ETHICS OF THE FATHERS IN THE LIGHT OF JEWISH HISTORY
59-60 (1970) (quoting 1:12 of Pirke Avot, a compilation of Jewish maxims on how to live an
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uals who do the right thing. 7 ' Another, perhaps less obvious, benefit
to society emerges from the fact that Rule 408 seems to reward the

ethic of peacemaking and compromise. As Professor David Leonard
notes, compromises promote civility and cooperation among parties
specifically and within society generally.7 2
Overwhelmingly, however, Rule 408, like Rule 407, is justified in
crude instrumental terms. 73 In the case of Rule 408, the extrinsic benefits of encouraging compromise stem from the relatively speedy and
inexpensive disposition of claims. 74 Any case settled out-of-court is
less expensive and less draining on the parties and on public dispute
resolution mechanisms, such as juries, courtrooms, judges, and other
court personnel. 75 The theory is that the veil of confidentiality will
allow for honest and frank talk that will lead to settlement. The evidence rules, therefore, facilitate such compromises, even though some
otherwise good evidence may be lost if the negotiations are not successful and the case ends up in court.
o In assessing these benefits, Rule 408, like Rule 407, does not rely
on empirical data to support the notion that parties will be more likely
to compromise if the exclusion is in place. Furthermore, Rule 408
does not rest on any empirical data concerning the effect on the fact
finder who learns of a party's offer to compromise.76

ethical life). It is not hard to find religious support for peaceful behavior. See, e.g., Islam: The
Holy Qur'an 8:61 ("And if they incline to peace, incline thou also to it, and trust in Allah.");
Christianity: Matthew 5:9 ("Blessed are the peacemakers for they shall be called the children of
God.").
71. See LEONARD, supra note 5, at § 3.3.4, at 3:37.
72. See id. § 3.3.3, at 3:31.
73. As the Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 408 explains: "A more consistently impressive ground is promotion of the public policy favoring the compromise and settlement of disputes." FED. R. EvID. 408 advisory committee's note.
74. See Reeder v. American Econ. Ins. Co., 88 F.3d 892, 895 (10th Cir. 1996) (citing the
"policy behind Rule 408, namely to promote the out-of-court settlement of claims"); Hjelmeset,
supra note 60, at 92-94 (examining the tensions between the policies of promoting settlement
negotiations and accommodating the "truth finding" process and noting that admission of settlement offers could inhibit settlement discussions and interfere with the effective administration of
justice). See generally Wayne D. Brazil, Protectingthe Confidentialityof Settlement Negotiations,
39 HASTINGS L.J. 955 (1988) (discussing the policies behind Rule 408 and examining potential
pitfalls that the rule presents to lawyers in settlement negotiations).
75. See John R. Schmertz, Jr., Relevancy and its Policy Counterweights: A Brief Excursion
Through Article IV of the ProposedFederalRules of Evidence, 33 FED. B.J. 1, 17 n.94 (1974) ("It
takes little imagination to picture the chaos that would pervade our entire federal court system if
every civil or criminal action filed
actually went to trial.").
76. See LEONARD, supra note 5, § 3.4, at 3:38-3:39.
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APOLOGY EXCEPTED
PROPOSAL FOR AN APOLOGY EXCEPTION

The Nature of Apologies

Apologies are all the rage. Apologies pervade our culture and
range from the lowest forms, evident on daytime talk shows where
daughters apologize for stealing their mothers' boyfriends, to the
highest and noblest goals. South Africa, for example, has bet its future on the value of honest confrontation of wrongful conduct, that is
to say on apologies, by forming the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission. 77
Recently, President Clinton apologized for the Tuskeegee experiments that, as part of a science project, allowed African American
men to suffer syphilis untreated for forty years.7" The United States
government apologized to Japanese Americans for interring them in
camps during World War II.7 The CIA apologized for failing to inform U.S. troops about known chemicals in Iraqi bunkers.8s The IRS
apologized for sending citizens erroneous statements about taxes
due." Former Senator Alfonse D'Amato apologized for ridiculing
Judge Ito, who presided over the O.J. Simpson murder trial, by using a
caricatured pidgin Japanese. 2 And, George Wallace apologized to
77. See Jean Bethke Elshtain, True Confessions, NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 10, 1997, at 12, 12;
GENDER RACE & JUST. 47, 49-52 (1997) (outlining the
procedures and philosophy of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, including the role of
apology).
78. 4ee Abigail Trafford, The Ghost of Tuskeegee, WASH. POST, May 6, 1977, at A19; Ellis
Cose, Forgive and Forget?, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 21, 1997, at 45.
79. See Sherry Joe Crosby, Festival Brings out Views on Atonement, DAILY NEWS LOS ANGELES, June 22,1997, at N4. Interestingly, however, a proposal that the United States apologize
to African Americans for slavery was not successful. See Scott Montgomery, Proposalto Apologize for U.S. Slavery Put On Hold Indefinitely, ATLANTA CONST. J., Aug. 7, 1997, at A9.
80. See Bill McAllister & Dana Priest, CIA Knew In '84 of Iraq Poison Gas, Agency Official
Apologizes to PersianGulf War GIs, WASH. POST, Apr. 10, 1997, at Al ("If you're looking for an
apology that we should have given this information out sooner, I'll give that apology. We should
have gotten it out sooner.").
81. See Andrew Rice, 'Infernal Revenue Service' No More? 'I'm Sorry' Could Be Part of
Agency's New Approach, NEWSDAY, Aug. 24, 1997, at A4. In addition, during a congressional
hearing into the practices of the IRS in investigating and collecting tax claims, IRS Commissioner Michael Donlan issued an apology saying: "No one should have endured what these
citizens describe as their experience at the hand of the tax system. At this point, I offer my
sincere apology to these taxpayers for any mistakes we have made and for any anguish we have
caused." Week in Review: Government and Politics, ProtectionMoney, SPOKESMAN REv., Sept.
28, 1997, at A2.
82. Senator D'Amato said: "As an Italian-American, I have a special responsibility to be
sensitive to ethnic stereotyping. I fully recognize the insensitivity of my remarks about Judge
Ito." See Yamamoto, supra note 77, at 80 (citing Asuz. REPUBLIC, Apr. 7, 1995, at A2). The
Senator's earlier apology, a two sentence press release saying that he "was sorry if anyone was
offended by his behavior," was deemed insufficient. Id.

Eric K. Yamamoto, Race Apologies, 1 J.
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Vivian Malone, thirty-three years after he stood in the schoolhouse
door, trying to keep the young black woman from integrating the University of Alabama.83
The phenomenon is international. Britain's Prime Minister Tony
Blair apologized for England's role in the Irish potato famine.84 Germany apologized for the invasion of Poland and has acknowledged its
guilt for its participation in the destruction of Guernica.85 France is
"determined to clear its conscience" for its treatment of French Jews
during World War 11.86 Australia's Prime Minister John Howard is
under pressure to offer an official apology to tens of thousands of aboriginal peoples who were taken from their homes and placed in white
foster care to overcome their "backward" culture.87 These examples
provide a hint that apologies may indeed have a more extensive function than making whole the rational economic actor.
The apologies I am concerned with tend to be more personal and
less driven by public forces or history. For instance, it is not unusual
for a plaintiff in a negligence action to declare that he would have
gladly settled his claim for payment of his actual medical bills-if only
the tortfeasor had acknowledged responsibility and had offered an
apology.88 Apologies also play a role in dealing with intentional torts,
particularly those that insult the plaintiff such as defamation or sexual
harassment. What did Paula Jones purportedly want from President
89
Clinton? An apology.
There are many types of apologies-private or public, individual
or group. Apologies can come from someone directly and personally
responsible (such as a harasser or a negligent driver) or a moral predecessor-in-interest (such as a national leader apologizing for prior
wrongs committed by her country or a parent apologizing for her
83. See Blocking the Schoolhouse Door: George Wallace Clears His Conscience, J.
IN HIGHER EDUC.,

BLACKS

Winter 1996/1997, at 67-68.

84. See Mea Culpa and All That, ECONOMIST, June 21, 1997, at 19.
85. See Germany Admits Guilt Over Guernica, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 1997, available in 1997
WL 7995314.
86. Roger Cohen, France Confronts Its Jews, and Itself, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 1997, available
in 1997 WL 8007916.
87. See Mea Culpa, supra note 84.
88. See, e.g., Heidi Li Feldman, Science and Uncertainty in Mass Exposure Litigation, 74
TEX. L. REV. 1, 35 (1995); Jonathan M. Hyman, Trial Advocacy and Methods of Negotiation:
Can Good Trial Advocates Be Wise Negotiators?, 24 UCLA L. REV. 863, 886 (1987).
89. See PaulaJones May Have Nixed a Clinton Settlement Offer, CHI. TRIB., June 11, 1998,
available in 1998 WL 2865715. Paula Jones ultimately relented and accepted $850,000 from President Clinton to settle her harassment claim, without an admission of wrongdoing. See James A.
Brenner & Neil A. Lewis, Clinton to Pay $850,000 to Settle Jones Claim of Sexual Harassment,

N.Y.

TIMES.

Nov. 14. 1998. at A6.
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child's behavior). Timing is crucial. After a critical time period, apologies are rarely acceptable; but apologies can also come too soon
before the offended party is ready to hear them and forgive.9"
Apologies are tricky to define. In his book, Mea Culpa, Nicholas
Tavuchis discusses the "mysteriously potent, symbolic act" that is the
apology. 91 According to Tavuchis an "apology has two fundamental
requirements: the offender has to be sorry and has to say so."' 92 At
their most "authentic," apologies are a "form of self-punishment that
cut[ ] deeply because we are obliged to retell, relieve, and seek forgiveness for sorrowful events that have rendered our claims to membership in a moral community suspect or defeasible." 93 At their
fullest, apologies should: (1) acknowledge the legitimacy of the grievance and express respect for the violated rule or moral norm; (2) indicate with specificity the nature of the violation; (3) demonstrate
understanding of the harm done; (4) admit fault and responsibility for
the violation; (5) express genuine regret and remorse for the injury;
(6) express concern for future good relations; (7) give appropriate assurance that the act will not happen again; and, if possible, (8) compensate the injured party.9 4
I wrestled with the question of whether a mere admission of error
without expression of contrition would fit under my proposed excep90. See Aaron Lazare, M.D., Go Ahead Say You're Sorry, PSYCHOL. TODAY, Jan.-Feb. 1995,
at 78 ("Timing can also doom an apology."); NICHOLAS TAVUCHIS, MEA CULPA: A SOCIOLOGY
OF APOLOGY AND RECONCILIATION 87-88 (1991). Stephen B. Goldberg and his colleagues

stated that:
Timing is a critical element. The expression of regret must come soon after the injury,
or at least soon after the injured person voices his or her grievance. Once the respondent has taken the alternative path of denying responsibility (and perhaps even hurling
countercharges), an apology is much more difficult to elicit, or even if given, to be
accepted.
Stephen B. Goldberg et al., Saying You're Sorry, 3 NEGOTIATION J. 221,223 (1987); see also How
to Say You're Sorry When You Don't Really Mean It and He Started It Anyway, REDBOOK, Nov.
1991, at 72 ("An apology should be timely and enthusiastic or it's worthless.") [hereinafter How
to Say You're Sorry].
91. TAVUCHIS, supra note 90, at 2.
92. Id. at 36. In this Article the words offender, tortfeasor, and wrongdoer will all be used
to describe the person who committed the act prompting an apology. The terms victim and
offended party will refer to the person or group receiving an apology.
93. Id. at 43 ("A good apology also has to make you suffer. You have to express genuine
soul-searching regret for your apology to be taken as sincere.").
94. See id. at 36; Hiroshi Wagatsuma & Arthur Rosett, The Implications of Apology: Law
and Culture in Japan and the United States, 20 L. & Soc'Y. REV. 461, 469-70 (1986) (listing the
criteria: "1. the hurtful act happened, caused injury and was wrongful; 2. the apologizer was at
fault and regrets participating in the act; 3. the apologizer will compensate the injured party; 4.
the act will not happen again; and 5. the apologizer intends to work for good relations in the
future").
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tion.9 5 From a utilitarian perspective, any admission of contrary facts
may provide the injured party with helpful information. This is particularly true, as we will see, in the case of medical malpractice, where
information about the harm is vital to the patient. Nevertheless, given
the human benefits of a full apology (of which admission of wrong is
only one element), I propose restricting the proposed exception to
apologies that include statements of contrition as well as the surrounding factual statements.96 Explanations alone, without expres97
sions of remorse or self-blame, are not enough.
Apologies that do not accept blame but express sympathy present
another critical issue.98 For example, if I say to a friend, "I'm so sorry
about your father's death," it is obviously not a confession to murder,
but rather an expression of connectedness, sympathy, and support.
These "sympathy apologies" do not fit into my definition of true apologies, but they are nonetheless highly desirable and deserve legal protection. Such expressions of support reinforce a sense of community
and serve as tonics to loneliness and alienation.9 9 Regrettably, because many people fear that a statement of sympathy will be mistaken
for an assumption of culpability, they do not issue them.10 0 In fact, the
state of Massachusetts has addressed this issue specifically by enacting
a law providing that "gestures expressing sympathy or a general sense
of benevolence relating to the pain, suffering or death of a person
involved in an accident ... shall be inadmissible as evidence of an
0
admission of liability in a civil action.' '
Even when an apology purports to accept responsibility, a question may arise concerning the declarant's sincerity and true accept95. Special thanks to Professor Harry Pratter who raised and discussed this point with me.
96. See, e.g., TAVUCHIS, supra note 90, at 8 (stating that "apologies require much more than
admission or confession of the unadorned facts of wrongdoing or deviance").
97. See How to Say You're Sorry, supra note 90, at 79.
98. See Kathleen Kelleher, Sorry May Not Be the Hardest Word, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 25, 1996,
at E3 ("'I'm sorry' doesn't necessarily mean-in the literal sense-'I goofed.' It often serves as
a verbal nod of acknowledgment that something regrettable has occurred without assigning

blame, or it is used as a mutual face-saving device."); Peter H. Rehm & Denise R. Beatty, Legal
Consequences of Apologizing, 1996 J. Disp. RESOL. 116, 116 ("Another reason some people say
'I'm sorry,' however, is to express sympathy or concern, even when they have done nothing

wrong.").
99. See infra notes 106-09 and accompanying text.
100. See infra notes 197-98 and accompanying text.
101. MAss. GEk. LAws ANN.ch. 233, § 23(D) (West Supp. 1998) ("Admissibility of benevolent statements, writings or gestures relating to accident victims," discussed briefly in Goldberg
et al., supra note 90, at 222).
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ance of blame.'1 2 Need apologies be genuine? Obviously, not all
apologies stem from noble motives. People may apologize to escape

punishment (as in criminal sentencing where expression of remorse
can lower a sentence); they may apologize to salve a guilty conscience;
or they may apologize to preempt further accusation or discussion of
one's wrongdoing. 10 3 But for an apology to be successful, the wrongdoer must perform a credible job of faking regret, if not contrition. 0 4

For the same reason, although apologies can be written, they are most
effective and affecting when delivered orally. Part of facing up to the

wrong is actually facing the human being wronged. The emotion of
true contrition is hard to fake in person and has a powerful effect on
the injured party.
Clearly, apologies resonate with religious overtones. 0 5 When we
apologize, we begin in a morally inferior position that resembles religious supplication; as with Judeo-Christian prayer, the offender finds
herself in the "unsettling position of seeking unconditional pardon
precisely in the context of our being categorically unworthy."'1 6 In
this respect, an apology resembles the religious confession. It has aspects of martyrdom and self-mortification. After confession and receiving absolution, the offender is able to return to the prior state of
grace.
On a personal level, apologies can transform individuals and regenerate relationships. 7 On a societal level, apologies are a force
that "maintain some modicum of social equilibrium," whether they
are about grand political events or a simple "sorry" for an inadvertent
jostle. 10 8 From an anthropological perspective, apologies illustrate im102. This brings to mind the so-called apology of then-Senator Bob Packwood to the women
who accused him of sexual misconduct: "Am I sorry? Of course. If I did the things that they
said I did." Packwood Says Diary Has Inaccuracies, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Sept. 11, 1995,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library (quoting former Senator Packwood's appearance on CBS's
television news show, Face the Nation).
103. Hence Oscar Wilde's observation concerning "the luxury [of] self reproach," whereby
an offender engages in showy self-flagellation to preempt criticism or anger. OSCAR WILDE,
THE PIcrURE OF DORIAN GRAY 110 (Penguin Books 1983) (1891). Wilde wrote: "There is a
luxury in self-reproach. When we blame ourselves we feel that no one else has the right to
blame us. It is the confession, not the priest, that brings absolution." Id.
104. As liberal Democratic Representative Barney Frank, an openly gay politician who was
recently called "Barney Fag" by conservative Republican Representative Dick Armey, explained: "Very often, the apology is not sincere ... but you still want it." Hollis L. Engley,
Sorry, But 'I'm Sorry,"' GANNETr NEWS SERVICE, Apr. 11, 1995, available in 1995 WL 2894516.
105. Tavuchis describes an apology as a "secular remedial ritual." TAVUCHIS, supra note 90,
at 13.
106. Id. at 34.
107. See id. at 6-7.
108. Id. at 5.
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portant facets of our moral culture and demonstrate the complexity of
intricate social relationships. From a sociological perspective, they
help establish the social notions of deviance and conformity." 9 Apologies validate our relationships, reinforce shared group norms, and
serve as a means for continued participation in a moral community. 110
In an odd way apologies also demonstrate something unique
about our species. The ability to feel remorse and to offer forgiveness
are two quintessentially human (and in fact highly valued) traits. The
power of words and gestures to erase or at least ease pain, anger, and
indignation makes apologies a fascinating, uniquely human subject for
study. 1 '
The benefits of apology are more than "merely" psychic or restorative of relationships. Apologies can generate tangible, practical
benefits. They serve as a type of "social lubricant,""' 2 helping our society to become more civil and less angry and violent. 1 3 Furthermore, when issued promptly and sincerely, apologies can substitute
for costly litigation. Whereas the offended party might have sued, instead the party accepts the apology of the person who caused the
harm. The conflict is resolved less expensively and in a more satisfying manner than courtroom adversity could achieve, particularly because creative solutions in addition to financial compensation can be
109. See Janet Holmes, Sex Differences and Apologies: One Aspect of Communicative Competence, 10 APPLIED LINGUISTICS 194, 210 (1989). Holmes states that "'by observing what people apologize for, we learn what cultural expectations are with respect to what people owe one
another' and we also learn 'about the rights and obligations that members of a community have
toward one another ....
." Id. (citations omitted). Apologies are not, however, necessarily
conservative, static forces. They can also serve to confirm the justice of a progressive cause
(such as apologies to previously ill-treated minority groups). Apologies can serve the purpose of
redefining social norms and can serve as acts "of submission to a shifting hierarchical order."
John 0. Haley, Comment, The Implications of Apology, 20 L. Soc'Y REV. 499, 503 (1986).
110. See Florian Columas, Poison to Your Soul: Thanks and Apologies Contractively Viewed,
in CONVERSATIONAL ROUTINE: EXPLORATIONS IN STANDARDIZED COMMUNICATION SITUATIONS AND PREPATI-ERNED SPEECH 84 (Florian Columas ed., 1981) ("Apologies indicate the
speaker's willingness to conform to conventional rules and social expectations.").
111. "[Ain investigation of apology is not only worthwhile in its own right but affords a
unique and fruitful perspective for readdressing the basic sociological questions of membership,
deviance, and conformity." TAVUCHIS, supra note 90, at 14.
112. Wagatsuma & Rosett, supra note 94, at 461.
113. As Judith Martin (a.k.a. Miss Manners) instructs:
People who boast that they 'never apologize, never explain,' or who claim that 'love is
never having to say you're sorry' ought to be ashamed of themselves and admit it and
ask forgiveness. Now that the duel is illegal, the apology is the only way left to settle
many disputes without getting blood on the sofa.
JUDITH MARTIN, MISS MANNERS' GUIDE TO EXCRUCIATINGLY CORRECT BEHAVIOR

474 (1982).
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woven into the reconciliation."

4

Even when an apology alone cannot

settle a dispute entirely, the apology serves to reduce tensions and
facilitate negotiations.' 1 5 Conversely, failure to apologize can exacerbate tensions, add indignation, and magnify the injury.' 6 It is the fi-

nal insult. As one woman, who sued her HMO for pressuring her
doctor to perform an angiogram so quickly that he punctured a main
artery while performing it, emphasized: "I don't remember anybody
saying, 'I'm sorry.' "1l17
Undoubtedly, apology is inherently a relational concept.11 8 Apologies remediate acts "that cannot be undone but that cannot go unno-

ticed without compromising the current and future relationship of the
parties, the legitimacy of the violated rule, and the wider social web in
which the participants are enmeshed.""' 9 Between individuals, apologies "acknowledge a shift in human relationships, and a yearning to
return to the previous balance."120

The dynamics of apology are complex because the power relationships between the parties are in flux. As one commentator observed, apologies operate as "an exchange of shame and power
between the offender and the offended.'

12

'

The wrongdoer gets for-

giveness and peace; the injured party gets dignity and perhaps reparation. An apology helps the wrongdoer by palliating feelings of guilt,
114. See Stephen E. Seckler, Expanding the Use of ADR in the Workplace, MASS. L. WKLY.,
Mar. 24, 1997, at B5 ("'People don't always want money; sometimes they just want an apology,'
says Leonard Marcus, who directs a conflict-resolution program in medical malpractice at the
Harvard School of Public Health.").
115. See Goldberg et al., supra note 90, at 221.
116. See Ray McEachern, MalpracticeLaws That Favor Physicians,INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Jan.
7, 1998, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library (letter to the editor recounting suicide of a friend and
asserting that the "doctor who injured her and then denied it should never sleep well again with
this on his conscience. A simple apology from him and she might well be alive still."); cf Marc
Davis, Court Records Offer Insight into Bizarre Jewish Mother Probe, VIRGINIAN-PILOT AND
LEDGER-STAR, Oct. 27, 1996, available in 1996 WL 10867485) (describing an erroneous IRS raid
and seizure of property and noticing that: "In the end, there were no criminal charges. Five
months after it began, the investigation was over, without even an apology.").
117. CBS Evening News (CBS television broadcast, Apr. 18, 1997, available in 1997 WL
5613015) (quoting Karen Springer).
118. See TAVUCHIS, supra note 90, at 13.
119. Id. at 14.
120. Id. at 19.
121. Lazare, supra note 90, at 42.
By apologizing, you take the shame of your offense and redirect it to yourself. You
admit to hurting or diminishing someone and, in effect, say that you are really the one
who is diminished-I'm the one who was wrong, mistaken, insensitive, or stupid. In
acknowledging your shame you give the offended the power to forgive. The exchange
is at the heart of the healing process.
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shame, and scorn.' 2 2 In appropriate cases, apologies allow the wrongdoer to rehabilitate his reputation, reinstate his self-worth, and assert
that the improper behavior was not intentional (thereby reaffirming as
well, the traversed social norms). 23 Paradoxically, after the offender
assumes a vulnerable stance and begs forgiveness, the balance of
power shifts, and the injured party bears the burdens of belief and
acceptance.24 The person who receives the apology bears social responsibility to the offender to forgive. 125 An apology offered and accepted asserts and reinforces a vital social connection, precisely the
type of interest esteemed by an ethic of care.
Perhaps a law and economics afficionada would see apology
merely as a bartered exchange in which remorse and regret are exchanged for forgiveness and peace. But what is the economic value of
an apology?126 It is certainly not fungible; one cannot trade in them.
1 27
The transaction is essentially about moral position and feelings.
122. See id.
123. The cultural icons, Ray and Tom Magliozzi, the hosts of the radio program Car Talk,
responded to a letter from a woman who rightfully believed that a mechanic had neglected to
tighten a lug nut, thereby placing her in grave danger of losing a tire. The following discussion
ensued:
Ray: What you should expect from him is an abject and sincere apology for putting
your life in danger. And I would base any decision on whether to use him again on how
abject and sincere that apology is.
Tom: Right. We know that everybody makes mistakes sometimes. You get distracted,
the phone's ringing, your wife just left you, two of your kids just joined the Moonies,
the IRS is on your case, it's 105 degrees in the shop, and you've got a rash on your butt
the size of Minneapolis. And in the midst of all that, you forgot to tighten a few lug
nuts. It happens. I've been there!
Ray: The important question is do you take responsibility for it? If he tries to weasel
out of it and says, "It couldn't have been me, I would never do anything like that...
those Honda lug nuts just come off by themselves sometimes, etc.," I'd dump him and
never go back, because then he's proved himself to be a bona fide sleazeball.
Tom: But if he says "Oh, my God, Elizabeth, I must have forgotten to tighten them in
all the confusion that day. I'm so sorry that I did that, I'm so glad nothing happened to
you; let me pay the towing bill," then I wouldn't hesitate to try him again, because he's
clearly an honest guy. And even competent, honest guys make mistakes once in awhile.
Ray: Of course, if it ever happens again, then he's an honest guy who also happens to
be a moron, in which case I would go to someone else. But I'd base my decision solely
on the forthrightness of his response. And we're glad you didn't get hurt either,
Elizabeth.
Ray & Tom Magliozzi, An Honest Guy Can Be a Moron, DES MOINES REGISTER, Aug. 17, 1997,
available in 1997 WL 6964967.
124. But see TAvucHis, supra note 90, at 19. (rejecting the notion that an apology also signals
a change in the relationship).
125. This does not indicate that all wrongs can be apologized for or that ill-apologizers
should be forgiven. Horrific, damaging behavior may be outside the healing power of apology,
and, consequently, will impart an obligation on the offendee to forgive.
126. See, e.g., TAVUCHIS, supra note 90, at 34 (The apology therefore is "not easily explicated
by elementary conceptions of reciprocity.").
127. Cf.Wagatsuma & Rosett, supra note 94, at 464.
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The outcome is always unpredictable. Unlike monetary compensation, which can come from many different sources (the tortfeasor's
employer, insurer, or estate), an apology can only come from the
wrongdoer or some successor-in-moral-interest. To constitute a suc-

cessful "transaction," emotions must enter the equation. With that
can serve as valuable tools in negotiation or
understanding, 1apologies
28
in remediation.
Obviously, not everyone agrees with my assessment of the value
of apology. In fact, public expression of regret-what Jean Elshtain
' and what Russell Baker has called our
has dubbed "contrition chic"129
national "apology binge""a°-has been subjected to derision. For instance, Art Buchwald, in discussing the CIA's failure to disclose the
location of poison gas to American troops in Desert Storm wrote:
[A] nice apology should suffice. In the past, being the head of the
CIA meant never having to say you're sorry ....The happy ending
to this story is that the GIs who may have been afflicted by the Iraqi
gas explosions now sleep better just knowing that the spooks in
Washington feel bad.' 3 1

The insincere, politically opportune, or pointless apology is a justifiable subject for derision. But that does not make apologies ineffective
or meaningless. In fact, the better question is not why some people
issue insincere apologies, but rather why, given the benefits of apologies, do so many people fail to issue them at all.
There are many things that limit a person's willingness to apologize. There is a natural disinclination to admit wrong; people are concerned that they will humble themselves, and diminish their stature
The relative absence of apology in American law may also be connected to the legal
system's historic preoccupation with reducing all losses to economic terms that can be
awarded in a money judgement and its related tendency either not to compensate at all
or to award extravagant damages for injuries that are not easily reducible to quantifiable economic losses.
Id.
128. See Goldberg et al., supra note 90, at 221 ("Many mediators have had one or more
experiences in which an apology was the key to a settlement that might otherwise not have been
attainable."). For instance, Professor Sharon Rush argues for an apology for slavery and racism
as an equitable remedy. See Sharon Elizabeth Rush, The Heart of Equal Protection: Education
and Race, 23 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 1, 50-57 (1997) (discussing the potential healing
effect of apologies).
129. Elshtain, supra note 77, at 12.
130. Russell Baker, No Time for the Future, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 1997, at A27.
131. Art Buchwald, Apologies by the CIA's Sorry Lot, STAR-LEDGER, Apr. 24, 1997, available in 1997 WL 8066417; see also James Dempsey, Pols Pick Up Repentance From Jocks: Everyone May Be Sorry, But No One's That Sorry, TELEGRAM & GAZETT-E (Worcester, MA), June 20,
1997, available in 1997 WL 3711877.
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vis-A-vis the persons from whom they beg forgiveness. 132 Those who
gave offense may be afraid that the apology will not be accepted. Additionally, moral cluelessness, arrogance, and self-righteousness can
render a person incapable of issuing an apology. 133 For others, difficulty in apologizing stems from insecurity and reluctance to admit er1 34
ror, lest they experience shame and lose others' love and respect.
In the United States, apologizing is considered demeaning 35 and "un-

manly.' 1 36 In contrast, in some other cultures, notably in Japan and
England, apology is an important means of communication and social
137
relation.

One final and, for our purposes, important limit on apology is our
litigious culture. Apologizing is very difficult precisely because to be
successful, it involves genuine emotion and even self-mortification. It
is "antithetical to the ever-pervasive values of winning, success, and
perfection. '138 The problem is not only temperamental, but practical.
We are afraid, quite rightly sometimes, that saying "I'm sorry" will
qualify as an admission that will be used against us in court. We fear
confusion, particularly if we wish to offer sympathy but do not feel at
fault. As one group of commentators noted:
Reluctance to apologize may also be the product of formal rules of
evidence which treat an apology as an admission of fault that can be
used to prove wrongdoing. Thus it is commonplace for insurance
companies and attorneys to advise policyholders against expressing
sympathy for a person injured by the policyholder, for
fear such an
39
expression will be treated as an admission of guilt.'

My proposal does not address the social, spiritual, and emotional
impediments to apology, but renders such litigation concerns obsolete.
132.

See TAVUCHIS, supra note 90, at 5, 14.

133. See id. at 67.
134. See Lazare, supra note 90, at 78.
135. See Goldberg et al., supra note 90, at 222; cf. John M. Sloop, "Apology Made to Whoever Pleases": CulturalDisciplineand the Ground of Interpretation,42 COMM. Q. 345, 353 (1994)
(stating that the hierarchical structure of apology is evident in rap group Public Enemy's fear
that apologizing for anti-Semitic remarks would "appear to be 'knuckling under' to white
media").
136. An apt term for a feminist critique. See infra notes 153-58 and accompanying text (discussing the gendered aspects of apology).
137. See Wagatsuma & Rosett, supra note 94, at 461-62 (comparing the United States to
Japan, and noting the prevalence of apologies in Japan); see also Columas, supra note 110, at 82;
Lucy Broadbent, L.A. Life, INDEPENDENT (London), Mar. 13, 1998, available in 1998 WL
13640558) (discussing a pedestrian who was hit by a car in Los Angeles but was very "British
about it," by apologizing to the anxious driver who had been entirely at fault); Deborah L. Levi,
Note, The Role of Apology in Mediation, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1165, 1165-66, 1183 (1997).
138. Lazare, supra note 90, at 40.
139. Goldberg et al., supra note 90, at 222.
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The Proposal

Because apologies are so crucial to social interaction and personal peace, it is desirable that law facilitate or, at least, not hinder the
possibility of this healing ritual. But apologies have a minimal role in
traditional law. Most notably, the fact of an apology is significant in a
libel action.'
Apologies have become more common in the quasilegal setting of mediation.' 4 ' Apologies operate primarily in less formal social spheres, concern the unwritten laws of the moral community, and reinforce the unwritten moral code. Nevertheless, their
existence or absence may have a profound effect on law in many disparate ways, including, most importantly, the questions whether compensation is necessary, to what degree, and how it will be obtained.
My proposal would except apologies and admissions of fault in
civil cases.' 42 Any statement of self-blame and contrition would be

inadmissible, as would be the surrounding facts. In this respect, it
would be similar to Rule 408, which excludes statements surrounding
the compromise negotiation. If I hit you with my car, I could apologize, and that apology would not be admissible as evidence (though
other means of proving fault, such as witnesses, skid marks, physics of
the collision, et al., could clearly be presented). An expression of contrition (e.g., "I'm sorry") and an acknowledgment of blame (e.g., "I
ran the red light. It was my fault.") would not forestall a lawsuit, but
140. Apology can be an effective tool to avoid litigation or to encourage prompt settlement
of a libel suit. According to a comprehensive study of libel cases involving the media, many
plaintiffs initially contacted the defendants to ask for an apology or correction. See John Soloski,
The Study and the Libel Plaintiff: Who Sues for Libel?, 71 IowA L. REv. 217, 220 (1985). Only
one-fifth of libel plaintiffs reported that they were suing for money damages; instead, most plaintiffs said that their primary reason for suing was to repair their reputation or to punish the media
defendant. See id. at 220.
Issuing an apology or retraction has always been one way for a libel defendant to mitigate
damages under the common law. See BRUCE W. SANFORD, LIBEL AND PRIVACY: THE PREVENTION AND DEFENSE OF LITIGATION § 12.3.1, at 479-80 (1987). Even in the absence of a state
mitigation statue, a retraction or apology may be considered evidence to rebut common law
malice, and it can also have an influence on the jury in subtle ways. See id. at 481-82; see also
Wagatsuma & Rosett, supra note 94, at 478-79.
141. See Goldberg et al., supra note 90, at 221 (noting that "[m]any mediators have had one
or more experiences in which an apology was the key to a settlement that might otherwise not
have been attainable"). See generally Levi, supra note 137.
142. My thanks to Roger Park for first raising the important distinction between civil and
criminal cases. See, e.g., Roger Park, A Subject Matter Approach to Hearsay Reform, 86 MICH.
L. REV. 51, 81 (1987). The complicated law of criminal admissions, including those advanced in
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), in addition to the fact that the policies of criminal law
involve public welfare as opposed to compensation for personal wrong, indicates that this proposal should not apply to criminal cases.
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could not in themselves be admitted as evidence of negligence or

wrongdoing, even for impeachment purposes.
Currently, evidence law treats such naked apologies and statements of blame (that is, those not part of a compromise) as admissions. As two advocates of apology have explained: "A crucial
inhibition to a person making an apology in an American legal proceeding is the possibility that a sincere apology will be taken as an
admission: evidence of the occurrence of the event and of the defend1' 44

ant's liability for it.'
First, I will analyze the proposed exception for apologies and admissions of fault along traditional evidentiary lines. After demonstrating some of the issues and possible objections under that
traditional approach, I will consider how a feminist approach enhances the analysis.
C.

TraditionalAnalysis

For the traditional approach, I return to the articulated policies
underlying Rules 407 and 408, beginning with the extrinsic policy of
encouraging settlement. 145 From a utilitarian point of view, some recent, yet limited, empirical research indicates that people who receive
a prompt apology are less likely to sue. 1 46 Certainly, although people
say that they would be less likely to sue, it would be hard to know for
sure. There is also anecdotal evidence that potential plaintiffs who are
immediately well-treated by the person who caused them harm are
less likely to sue. 1 4 7 Second, under a traditional analysis, as with
Rules 407 and 408, there is also the policy against punishing dogooders.148 Just as we do not want to penalize those good folks who
repair or who compromise, 4 9 we might not want to punish those peo143. See Wagatsuma & Rosett, supra note 94, at 479. ("In American law, a statement that
meets the standards of a sincere apology ...might also be characterized as an admission of
liability admissible against the utterer."); see also supra notes 41-46 and accompanying text.
144. Wagatsuma & Rosett, supra note 94, at 483.
145. See supra Part III for a discussion of the policies underlying Rules 407 and 408 and
supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text for a discussion of the policy of encouraging
settlement.
146. See infra notes 268-69 and accompanying text.
147. For instance, after Delta Air Lines, Flight 191 crashed, Delta sent a representative to
assist the families of each passenger who was injured or died as a result of the crash. See Tom
Howlett, Delta's Care Helped Deter Suits, DALLAS MoRN.NEWS, Aug. 3, 1986, available in 1986
WL 4331186. Delta flew family members to the crash scene, provided air fare, car rental and
other accommodations, including funeral arrangements, if necessary. See id. Fewer suits were
filed
against Delta because potential plaintiffs saw the airline as their friend. See id.
148. See supra notes 50, 70-72 and accompanying text.
149. See, e.g., supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text.
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pie who are kind and polite enough to apologize. Finally, there is the
issue of relevance-those who apologize are not necessarily in the
wrong. They may apologize out of fear, out of a desire to placate
another, or to terminate a dispute.
Evaluating my proposal under this traditional scheme, it is hard
to- say, on balance, whether the social benefits and issues of fairness
that would prompt us to exclude apologies would justify such an exception. This would be particularly true where the potential lost evidence seems so powerful, such as when a defendant in a traffic
accident admits fault and says, "Sorry, I ran the light." Such evidence
seems not only to be reliable but morally appropriate. After all, the
admissions rule reflects a basic premise of evidence law-the adversary system.150 The theory behind the rule of admissions emanates as
much from the law of the sandbox, as from the law of rationality. Its
premise is: "Ha, ha, you said it, now you're stuck with your own
admission."
D. A Feminist Approach
The best, most convincing reasons for adopting an evidentiary exception for apologies arise out of extrinsic policy concerns best explained by feminist analysis. As noted under the traditional analysis,
people may tend to sue less often when they receive an apology, but
that in itself is not the most persuasive reason for encouraging apologies. The very reasons that people are less likely to sue-their sense
of acknowledgment, feelings of dignity, connections to the wrongdoer,
and participation in an important social ritual-explain the feminist
advocacy of apology. Apologies are valuable for many reasons that
are hard to quantify-all related to power dynamics, relationships,
and practical, contextual solutions to difficult human problems. A
feminist analysis provides the missing pieces, explaining more fully the
benefit of apologies and why we should aspire to this "sorry" state.' 5 '
First, feminists worry about those whose impulse to apologize and
reconcile is so strong that it is not deterred by the possibility of suit.
In the case of Rule 407, a feminist might be concerned about the peo150. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
151. Feminism is not the only form of jurisprudence outside mainstream Western culture that
values apologies. In Japan, apologies are part of settlements and are intrinsic not only to settling
civil cases but also to sentencing in criminal matters. See Wagatsuma & Rosett, supra note 94, at
462. The benefits of apology are tremendous, but if one waits for mediation or sentencing, it is
often too late. See Levi, supra note 137, at 1186-88. Apologies are most effective on the spot,
not after litigation has been threatened, when the plaintiff is not only feeling injured, but
aggrieved.

250
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pie who are so connected and concerned with others that they will
repair a defect no matter what. Similarly, some people will apologize
for harm they caused even if such admissions of fact or indications of
contrition disadvantage them in court. Traditional evidence analysis
values "good guy" behavior, and one of the rationales behind Rules
407 and 408 is to avoid punishing those who do good.152 The argument is much stronger however, from a feminist vantage point that
values empathy and connection.
Furthermore, a feminist analysis would be very concerned with
the gendered effect of so-called gender neutral rules, such as the admissions doctrine,153 which currently allows statements of apology
into evidence. There is much anecdotal evidence and some empirical
data that the apologizers of this world-those who are empathetic,
quick to accept blame, and concerned with harmony-are more likely
to be women. Psycholinguist, Deborah Tannen, has studied communication in the workplace and observed that women tend to apologize
more often and use apologies as a social device to smooth over difficulties or to repair relationships. 54 In some cases, a woman's apology
is like a verbal tick, more of a ritualized gesture or speaking style than
necessarily an acceptance of blame. "Women tend more than men to
use apology strategies which recognize the claims of the victim."' 55
Men, on the other hand, "learn early to act strong, independent and
self-assured, and to always save face by not admitting fault."' 56 As
Deborah Tannen explained:
[Alpologizing is seen as a sign of weakness. This explains why more
men than women might resist apologizing, since most boys learn
early on that their peers will take advantage of them if they appear

152. See supra notes 50, 69-71 and accompanying text.
153. See supra notes 40-46 and accompanying text.
154. See Carol Lynn Mithers, Don't Be Sorry, LADIES HOME J., Sept. 1994, at 62.
155. Holmes, supra note 109, at 209.
156. Mithers, supra note 154, at 62. "Men do not say they are sorry for much the same
reason that they do not ask directions when they are driving-they see communications as competition and they do not want to seem vulnerable." Amy Ash Nixon & Fran Silverman, A
'Sorry' Lot: If Some Women are Apologetic, They Just Think It's Copacetic, HARTFORD COURANT, Mar. 10, 1997, available in 1997 WL 2986316 (quoting Leslie Beebe, Professor of Linguis-

tics and Education at Columbia University's Teachers College). Dr. L. C. Winterscheid,
Associate Dean and Medical Director of the University of Washington School of Medicine in
Seattle, says that "early intervention is very important-going to the patient, apologizing, explaining what happened and why, and compensating for the costs." John 0. Haley, Comment,
The Implications of Apology, 20 L. & Soc'v. RE\,. 499, 505 (1986).
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in ways
weak. Girls, in contrast, tend to reward other girls who talk157
that show they don't think they're better than their peers.

Arguably, the current state of evidence law may disadvantage
women who as a group tend to apologize more frequently and to apologize even when they do not believe that they have engaged in any
wrongful conduct.' 58 Often the "apology" does not literally mean that
the woman believes that she has engaged in wrongful conduct; rather
it is issued as a means of expressing sympathy and a means of acknowledgment of the other person's pain or difficulty. 59
There is actually some scholarly debate over the extent to which
sex differences exist with regard to apologies; 160 generally, most of the
study is psycholinguistic, looking at casual apologies for petty daily
This inare
itsignificant
injuries. apologies
offenses
and not major
sympathetic
given apologies
the intent for
to which
self is significant,
157. Deborah Tannen, I'm Sorry, I Won't Apologize, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 1996, (Magazine),
at 34.
158. See Mithers, supra note 154, at 62. Mithers states:
"Because men are less likely than women to apologize as an automatic way of being
considerate, they may interpret what a woman says as an actual apology." And that
may leave a woman in a less powerful position: She may be seen as weak or bumbling,
or she may be assigned blame for things that aren't her fault. When a woman constantly uses ritual apology in a business setting, Tannen says, "she may be seen as
incompetent."
Id. (quoting Tannen); see also Amy Ash Nixon & Fran Silverman, Sorry Situation: There's a
Gender Gap When it Comes to Apologies, SEATrLE TIMES, Mar. 30, 1997, available in 1997 WL
3226224 ("Why is there such a gender gap in this sorry situation? Experts suggest men feel
apologizing puts them in a one-down position, a spot they are not happy or at all comfortable in,
but a spot some women may be used to.").
159. See Mithers, supra note 154, at 58, 62 (stating that "women's excess apologizing is simply a matter of speaking style" and that "[miany women will say 'I'm sorry' not as a literal
apology but as a way of acknowledging that something may have been difficult for the other
person"); Men and Women: Genderlects, ECONOMIST, July 20, 1991, at 107 (reviewing DEBORAH
TANNEN, YOU JUST DON'T UNDERSTAND: WOMEN AND MEN IN CONVERSATION, and stating
that "[w]omen tend to say they are sorry more often than men do, but this should not always be
taken for an apology. Sometimes they simply mean that they regret something without taking
any of the blame themselves, but this is often misunderstood").
160. See Holmes, supra note 109, at 197 (noting "significant sex differences in the distribution of apologies"). But cf Levi, supra note 137, at 1184-85 (stating that the "relationship between the parties' genders and the likelihood of apology is thus far undemonstrated"); Judith
Mattson Bean & Barbara Johnstone, Workplace Reasons for Saying You're Sorry: Discourse
Task Management and Apology in Telephone Interviews, 17 DISCOURSE PROCESSES 59, 79 (Roy
0. Freedle ed., 1994) (noting that in telephone interviews more males used apology forms than
females but explaining this anomalous result as reflecting the fact that men tend to apologize
more for intrusions on others' time, whereas women apologize for intrusions on another's space,
and that given the exercise, men were probably more justified in apologizing; also noting that
men apologize primarily to strangers, whereas women are more likely to apologize to someone
with whom they have a relationship).
161. See generally Holmes, supra note 109.
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sometimes used as evidence against the parties who issued them. 162 I
am aware of no empirical evidence that gender differences exist for
profound apologies for serious infractions. The disparate impact of
apologies for serious offenses raises interesting questions meriting further study. One need not demonstrate a disparate impact on women,
however, to apply a feminist analysis. Instead, applying the teachings
and methods of feminism-the ethic of care, the attention to emotion,
the focus on context, the suspicion of neutral rules, and the search for
oppression or other vestiges of patriarchy-illuminates the evidence
rules and offers directions for making them more humane, inclusive,
and effective.
Feminists, particularly dominance feminists, screen for rules that
reflect power imbalances and vestiges of oppressive sex roles. One
way of looking at apologies is to perceive them as reordering the hierarchy of entitlement and power. 6 3 The one who apologizes humbles
himself, and the recipient of the apology becomes more powerful.
Dominance feminism would recognize that apologies may be a style of
coping for subordinate groups-weaker groups who are acculturated
to apologize, to curry favor, to ensure safety, and to reinforce the hierarchy.'" The starkest feminist example is the wife who after being
beaten by her husband apologizes and blames herself for provoking
the attack.1 65 Even in less dramatic and wrenching circumstances,
however, women may be disproportionately disadvantaged by a system of evidence rules that protects offers to compromise claims, but
ignores apologies outside legal transactions.
The most interesting insights emerge from cultural feminism.
Difference feminism would focus on how apologies can work to reinforce connections between people, maintain relationships, and serve
society at large.'6 6 A feminist analysis from the perspective of an
ethic of care explains the benefit of apologies in ways distinct from the
traditional evidence model. It values behavior that traditional evidence policy seems not to notice or care about. A feminist analysis,
guided by the ethic of care, would observe that apologies address the
162. See infra note 297 and accompanying text (describing lawsuits against doctors who expressed sympathetic apologies).
163. See Levi, supra note 137, at 1178 ("By apologizing, the offender acknowledges her diminutive moral stature and asks for restorative forgiveness.").
164. See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
165. See Malinda L. Seymore, Isn't It a Crime: Feminist Perspectives on Spousal Immunity
and Spousal Violence, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 1032, 1042 (1996).
166. See supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text.
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problems of three different constituencies:
tortfeasor, and society at large.

the injured party, the

1. The Injured Party
The injured party craves apology because apologies meet many
peculiarly human needs. This extrinsic benefit-responding to the
emotional needs of the wronged or injured party-is not something
that evidence law traditionally values. Admittedly, people whose
emotional need for acknowledgment is met are less likely to sue or to
shoot up a post office, but there are other compelling reasons to care
about meeting their needs. Meeting such needs is important to the
type of human concerns recognized and celebrated by an ethic of care.
The acknowledgment of wrongs-even without more-can be healing,
by serving as validation. Apologies are the antithesis of the Gaslight
phenomenon. 1 67 Apologies validate feelings and reassure the
wronged party that he or she is not crazy or unreasonable to feel aggrieved. Instead, apologies acknowledge that the injured party was, in
fact, actually wronged and deserves to be noticed. The psychological
effect of such affirmation is very strong and positive.
2.

The Wrongdoer

Equally interesting is the second perspective of looking at my
proposed rule from the wrongdoer's point of view (which is, of course,
what Rules 407 and 408 do, but only in a very truncated way). Here, I
would emphasize not just the economic needs of the wrongdoer, but
her emotional needs as well. An ethic of care analysis would be concerned with the anguish of the party who made the mistake-the one
who ran a red light, or made a racist remark, or missed an important
court deadline. An ethic of care would not presume that any of these
actors merely wants to escape financial responsibility (though certainly that is an important consideration). An ethic of care would also
accommodate the fact that many wrongdoers possess a strong need to
exculpate guilt or, at the very least, express sympathy.
This discussion of the needs of the wrongdoer is not meant to
imply that wrongdoers everywhere are just waiting for the evidentiary
green light to fulfill their deepest desire to apologize. As a mother of
167. The Alfred Hitchcock film Gaslight features an evil husband, played maliciously by

Charles Boyer, who seeks to steal his wife's fortune. The husband tries to convince his wife,
played by Ingmar Bergman, that she is going crazy, in part by turning up and down the intensity
of a gaslight and pretending not to notice any changes in the light. See ROBIN WOOD, HrrCHCOCK's FILMS REvIS1rED 317 (1989).
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teenagers, I witness daily the depths of human mean-spiritedness and
self-justification. I am not deceived into thinking that my proposed
exception will always prompt apologies and that civility will bloom. In
many cases, the tortfeasor will reject apology as an option because of
pride, stubbornness, or fear that the apology will alert a potential
plaintiff to the wrongdoing even though it would be inadmissible
should a suit follow. 168 Rather than view this proposal as an incentive
to apologize, I suggest it as a facilitation, allowing wrongdoers to follow their higher impulses and as protection for those who would like
to apologize.
3. Society's Interest
Finally, it is worthwhile to look at the problem from a larger
point of view. In our current age of public fascination with the trial du
jour, it is beyond cavil that evidence law affects and shapes our society. We already recognize the power of evidence law to shape behavior outside the courtroom by informed participants who act in the
shadow of the rules. 169 I think it is time that we acknowledge the true
reach of our evidence rules and address the ways they may subtly reflect and shape our cultural presumptions and our out-of-court
actions.
From a social vantage point, apologies are valuable for three reasons. First, they bespeak a more civil and humane society. The benefit is not merely in the absence of conflict, vengeance, or the modern
equivalent of blood feuds-lawsuits. Rather, the benefit of my proposal is that our world would be a more pleasant place in which to live.
People who apologize will feel more protected; they may still be sued,
but their kind, heartfelt apology could not be used against them in
court. People who respond to incentives (evidentiary and economic)
will at least not be hindered by apologizing (which coincidentally
might indeed be a smart economic move). These apologies could not
be used as weapons in the courtroom to portray their issuers as looselipped ninnies. Instead, the rules of evidence, however subtly, will
promote their issuance.
Second, apologies also serve society in encouraging honest discussion of mistakes. A professional who is encouraged by colleagues, his
malpractice insurer, and indirectly the evidence code to hush up er168. See supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text.
169. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 3.6 (1995) (regulating trial
publicity and extrajudicial statements of lawyers).
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rors, will not learn from his mistakes. It's hard to improve while you
pretend and perhaps even convince yourself that you are perfect.
Third, and finally, apologies can set a tone for society and help us
define the boundaries of acceptable conduct. When a harasser apologizes for causing pain and acknowledges that her comments were offensive, she acknowledges the feelings, needs, and sense of reality of
the person she harassed. She provides herself an opportunity for healing, expiation of guilt, and learning. Perhaps most importantly, she
sets the standard and articulates the parameters of respectful social
discourse. By admitting fault, she tacitly promises not to engage in
such behavior and is contributing to a shared understanding of how an
organized society should look.
I recognize that there may be problems with apologies if they are
used in lieu of fair compensation, and if rich and sophisticated actors
take advantage of poor unsophisticated victims. 170 Yet, such disparate
power is nothing new, and an apology-even if a corporate ployenhances quality of life. Under the current legal regime, corporations
are discouraged from apologizing at all. Though it might be maddening for a defendant-corporation to deny in court what it admitted in
an apology, the plaintiff on balance is better off-as are we all- in a
culture that promotes rather than inhibits expressions of apology and
contrition.
V.

APOLOGIES IN ACTION

As a general proposition, apologies have remarkable healing
power. 171 As discussed above, they can make life better both for the
victim, who feels acknowledged, and for the wrongdoer, who feels forgiven. 72 Apologies connect people, validating the importance of the
individual who was wronged and the relationship between the parties.
This focus on feelings and interpersonal dynamics is crucial when an
73
ongoing relationship exists between the offender and injured party.'
Promoting apology is particularly important in the context of a
professional relationship. The relationship between a professional
170. My thanks to Seth Lahn for raising this point. Cf. Fritz Wenisch, The Hypocracy of
Official Apologies, PROVIDENCE JOURNAL-BULLETIN, July 26, 1997, available in 1997 WL
1084419 ("If you have received apologies from big corporations, you know that they often are
about as sincere as your 'sincerely' placed at the end of a letter to the IRS.").
171. See, e.g., Wagatsuma & Rosett, supra note 94, at 461-62.
172. See supra Part IV.D.1-2.
173. See Goldberg et al., supra note 90, at 221 ("[T]o the extent that the dispute has occurred
in the context of an ongoing relationship, the apology is valuable in repairing whatever harm to
the relationship has resulted from the dispute.").
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and the one served (e.g., lawyer-client, clergyperson-penitent, doctorpatient) depends on personal connections as well as expert service.
Such professional relationships often encompass a high degree of trust
and rely on outside professionals' expertise, because laypeople are
174
often unable to evaluate the quality of the service.
From a social perspective, we value professional relationships. 175
Professional relationships foster human autonomy by giving the
layperson access to expert assistance beyond personal knowledge and

skill.' 76 Paradoxically, such relationships can also serve society by limiting the client or a patient's bad behavior.

77

The professional can

service for antisocial (but not illegal) activities. 78 When an atmosphere of acceptance and trust exists between professional and layperson, the professional can offer advice and serve as a pressure-release
mechanism, listening to clients vent and counseling them against dan79
gerous or unwise courses of action.
As a general matter, apologies are vital to professional relation80
ships because honesty is central to these fiduciary associations.
Apologies can cement the relationship by emphasizing the victim's importance to the professional and the professional's loyalty to the victim. Professionals who do not apologize run the risk of alienating
their clients and losing their trust.
To illustrate my proposal and to elaborate on its potential benefits, I will examine the relationship between doctors and patients
where the doctor has made a mistake. Part of the reason for my interest stems from the fact that medical errors-their effect on patients,
174. Several decades ago, Dean Roscoe Pound defined professionalism: "'The term refers to
a group ... pursuing a learned art as a common calling in the spirit of public service-no less a
public service because it may incidentally be a means of livelihood. Pursuit of the learned art in
the spirit of a public service is the primary purpose."' Presiding Justice Guy James Mangano,
Thoughts on Legal Professionalism,N.Y. L.J., Feb. 10, 1997, at 1 (quoting Dean Roscoe Pound).
175. The evidentiary privileges that shield confidential communications with these aforementioned professionals indicate that our society recognizes the importance of these professional
relationships. See, e.g., FED. R. EviD. 501 (providing that the "principles of the common law" of
privilege shall govern witnesses in most federal actions).
176. See, e.g., Stephen L. Pepper, The Lawyers Ethical Amoral Role: A Defense, A Problem,
and Some Possibilities, 1986 A. B. F. RES. J. 613, 617-18 (1986) (asserting that a lawyer should
not impose his or her personal morality on a client but acknowledging that a "lawyer is the
means to first-class citizenship, to meaningful autonomy, for the client").
177. See id. at 614.
178. See generally David Luban, The Lysistratian Prerogative: A Response to Stephen Pepper,
1986 A. B. F. RES. J. 637 (1986) (arguing that the law's facilitation of individual autonomy may
be legally right but morally wrong).
179. See Pepper, supra note 176, at 613.
180. See, e.g., Albert W. Wu et al., To Tell the Truth: Ethical and PracticalIssues in Disclosing Medical Mistakes to Patients, 12 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 770, 770, 772 (1997).
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doctors, and on the doctor-patient relationship-have emerged as an
important issue for the medical community. 18 1 In addition, the doctor-patient relationship can serve as an important, if slightly unusual
paradigm. Apologies are an obvious remedy when an offense was intentionally or recklessly committed, such as in libel or harassment
cases. 182 They are less obvious, but I will argue, equally important and
potent when no offense was intended, yet errors with serious conse-

quences arose. Finally, a feminist approach is particularly appropriate
in the context of a professional relationship tending to reflect an imbalance in power. When the patient is physically and emotionally vulnerable, she must depend on the doctor for information and
treatment. 3 This tends to deify the physician and infantilize the patient. Feminists have noticed, in particular, the way that this dynamic
operates between male doctors and female patients (especially in obstetrics and gynecology).'8 4 Because feminist scholarship is concerned
with relationships, the bond between the healer and the one to be
healed is a fascinating object for study.
A.

The Extent and Effect of Malpractice
1. The Nature of the Harm

The extent of harm inflicted by medical malpractice is staggering.
A Harvard study estimated that the number of people injured or
killed by medical malpractice in hospitals is the equivalent of one
181. Recently, Dr. Albert Wu urged doctors to disclose errors to their patients, to apologize,
and to make every effort to repair the damage, including compensation to the patient. See generally Wu et al., supra note 180. See also Denise Grady, Researchers Urge Doctors to Admit Mistakes and Apologize, PITrSBURGH POST-GAZET-rE, Dec. 14, 1997, available in 1997 WL
16585300.
182. Not all medical malpractice consists of honest mistakes; some types of negligence reflect
callous indifference, such as failure to treat a dying child. See Today (NBC television broadcast,
Jan. 12, 1998, available in 1998 WL 5260829) (reporting a doctor's failure to diagnose and
promptly treat an 11-month-old baby in critical condition, which resulted in the child's death).
183. See Marlynn L. May & Daniel B. Stengel, Who Sues Their Doctors? How Patients Handle Medical Grievances,24 L. & Soc'v. REV. 105, 110 (1990) ("[Tlhe patient/doctor connection is
unique in the 'personal' bond that links the parties. The doctor is dealing with the patient's body
and health and may literally hold the life of the patient in his/her hands. Obviously, this is an
extremely personal matter for the patient.").
184. See Sylvia A. Law, Silent No More: Physicians' Legal and Ethical Obligationsto Patients
Seeking Abortions, 21 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 279, 295 (1994) ("In practice, the tradition of medical paternalism is particularly strong in relation to women patients."); Patricia Peppin, Power and Disadvantage in Medical Relationships, 3 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 221, 222-23 (1994)
(describing the inherent imbalance in the relationship between doctor and patient and arguing
that the imbalance results in a loss of "dignity and sense of self," which "undermines personal
effectiveness and authentic representation of self").
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jumbo jet crashing every day. 185 The study reviewed more than 30,000
randomly selected hospital records from New York State facilities in
1984 and estimated that, "the rate of adverse events due to negligence
[was] 1.0 percent.' 1 86 Such mistakes, which account for at least 80,000
(and some would say as high as 150,000) deaths a year, have been
verified through research. 187 The details culled from the recent head-

lines are as varied as they are horrifying. There was the accidental
removal of a patient's noncancerous lung; 88 a thirteen-year-old's
death from a punctured artery six hours after a routine appendectomy; 189 and the needless surgery to remove pins from a three-yearold's arm that had already been removed, because the surgeon had
failed to read the chart. 190

2. Absence of Self-Reporting
Not only is malpractice rampant, but most doctors do not report
their errors. In one study, doctors-in-training at three large teaching
185. See Primetime Live: Critical Condition-HospitalMistakes (ABC television broadcast,
May 24, 1995, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library) (reporting the findings of a 1991 Harvard
Study reprintedin Troyen A. Brennan, M.P.H., M.D., J.D. et al., Incidence of Adverse Events and
Negligence in Hospitalized Patients-Results of the Harvard Medical Practice Study 1, 324 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 370 (1991) [hereinafter The Harvard Study]).
186. The Harvard Study, supra note 185, "reviewed 30,121 randomly selected records from
51 randomly selected acute care, non-psychiatric hospitals in New York State in 1984." Id. at
370. It concluded that "[t]here is a substantial amount of injury to patients from medical mismanagement, and many injuries are the result of substandard care." Id. Because the study focused on the delivery of medical care, rather than just on filed malpractice suits, it captured a
broad picture of malpractice, including cases unknown to the patient or for which the patient
chose not to sue. See id. at 370-71. Approximately one in 27 hospitalizations resulted in an
iatrogenic injury to the patient (labeled by the researches as an 'adverse event'). See Thomas B.
Metzloff, Understandingthe Malpractice Wars, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1169, 1177-78 (1993) (book
review) (discussing The Harvard Study). Among those injuries, "one in four was due to negligence." Id. at 1178. "From this, the study concluded that approximately one percent of all hospital admissions resulted in an injury caused by physician or hospital negligence." Id.; see also
Jane Goldman, Preventing Malpractice, (visited Oct. 29, 1998) <http://www.medscape.com/time/
hippocrates/1997/vlln.10/hll0.01.gold.html> (discussing the findings of The Harvard Study and
noting that only one in 50 of the one percent of patients who suffered some sort of medical
negligence actually filed suit).
187. See Primetime Live, supra note 185 (detailing cases of needless surgery, grossly negligent diagnoses, and callous treatment); Sheldon P. Blau, M.D., "Whoops, We Ruptured Your
Artery," MEN'S HEALTH, July 1, 1997, available in 1997 WL 9732311 (reporting a doctors personal account of experiencing medical mistakes).
188. See Linda P. Campbell, Doctor Loses Suit Against Lawyers, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Apr. 30, 1998, available in 1998 WL 239430.

189. See Mike Flaherty, Tragic Story Marks Debate Over Limits on Suing Doctors, Wis. ST.
J., Oct. 15, 1997, available in 1997 WL 12294550.
190. See Sharon Course, Needless Surgery Pin-Pointed,SUNDAY NEWS, May 24, 1998, available in 1998 WL 8976824.
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hospitals often failed to disclose their serious mistakes; only half told
the senior physicians, and only one-quarter told the patients. 19 1 Similarly, a Journalof the American Medical Association study asked physicians what they would do if they realized that they had accidentally
administered a lethal dose of medication to an eighty-year-old man
suffering from very high blood pressure.1 92 Fifty-five percent of the
doctors said they would inform the patient's family that they inadvertently overdosed the patient. 9 3 But, "[a]lmost thirty percent said
they'd tell the family, '[t]he patient required strong medication, and
his drop in blood pressure was a known risk." ' 194 (Technically, the
remark would be true, but it would include no mention of the negligent homicide.) More shocking, ten percent would have told the patient's family that the man was very sick and died despite the doctor's
best efforts. 95
3.

The Reasons Doctors Hesitate to Inform Patients of Errors
and to Apologize

Although medical ethics manuals have long called for full disclosure to patients, 9 6 doctors who are concerned about lawsuits and
their reputations often ignore their ethical duty to disclose, let alone
apologize. 9 7 The main reason doctors give is that they are fearful that
anything they tell a patient about a medical mistake can and will be
used against them in a court of law.' 98 They are afraid that disclosure
will notify the patient, or the patient's family, that a cause of action
exists; hence, any apology by the doctor will be "Exhibit A" in the
subsequent lawsuit.' 99 Currently, this understanding of the law is basically correct, though exaggerated when it comes to issuing statements
191. See Wu et al., supra note 180, at 770. Such mistakes include misdiagnosis, incorrect drug
prescription, and surgical errors. See Grady, supra note 181 (discussing Dr. Wu's research).
192. See Robert L. Lowes, Made a Bonehead Mistake? Apologize, 74 MED. ECON. 94, May
12, 1997, available in 1997 WL 10004788 (reporting the study's results and discussing the dilemma doctor's face after making medical mistakes).
193. See id.

194. Id.
195. See id.
196. See infra notes 222-25 and accompanying text.
197. See generally Joan Vogel & Richard Delgado, To Tell the Truth: Physicians' Duty to
Disclose Medical Mistakes, 28 UCLA L. REV. 52, 54-55, n.21 (1980) (recounting horrific examples from American case law where doctors failed to disclose essential information about their
own negligence to patients and their families).
198. See Grady supra note 181.
199. See id.; Lowes, supra note 192.
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of sympathy because courts do not necessarily consider them
admissions.2 °°
Many malpractice insurers affirmatively "'instruct doctors not to
admit fault to patients without consulting the company or their hospital's lawyer.' "201 According to one medical academic, "'[T]he
message is very clear from insurers that even in the case of an obvious
mistake, the doctor should retreat from the patient and do all his communicating through his lawyer. ' ' 20 2 Some malpractice policy language also appears to place severe limits on what doctors can say to
patients, who suffered as a result of a medical error, or their families.20 3 Even many of the progressive companies, who do not interfere
with doctor-patient dialogue, prohibit doctors from admitting liability. 20 4 Often lawyers will instruct doctors to say nothing until all the
evidence is in-much later than patients and their families need to
feel valued and respected, and way after panic and anger has set in.2 °5
Ironically, by doing so "physicians may be encouraging the very thing
200. See Rehm & Beatty, supra note 98, at 118-19 (distinguishing between true admissions
and apologizing for expressions of sympathy and noting that courts usually do not consider the
latter to be admissions of fault). But cf Robertson v. LaCroix, 534 P.2d 17, 22 (Okla. Ct. App.
1975) (holding that the defendant doctor's "statement that he 'just made a mistake and got over
too far' is more than a mere statement of mistaken judgement; it constituted an admission of
negligence during the performance of the surgery"); Sheffield v. Runner, 328 P.2d 828, 830 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1958) (doctor's statement after examining the deceased that "I should have put her in
the hospital" was admissible with other evidence allowing plaintiff's case to go forward); Dees v.
Pace, 257 P.2d 756, 759 (Cal. Ct. App. 1953) (admitting testimony that following the discovery of
the cut in plaintiff's bladder, the doctor stated, "'we all make mistakes' and said he had made a
mistake"); cf also infra note 298 (noting several cases where plaintiffs sued because of doctors'
apologies).
201. Grady, supra note 181 (quoting Mark Hatlie, a lawyer and executive director of the
National Patient Safety Foundation, founded by the American Medical Association).
202. Lowes, supra note 192 (quoting psychiatrist Thomas G. Gutheil, a professor at Harvard
Medical School).
203. See id. (quoting one policy that precluded the doctor or any representative from
"enter[ing] into any negotiation or discussion of any kind with any other party or its representative, regarding any liability insured by this policy without the comment of the Company" (emphasis added)).
204. See id.
Far from trying to hide the truth, malpractice carriers have sound reasons for asking
physicians to consult with them before they apologize to a patient about a mistake.
When doctors hold themselves responsible for a poor outcome, say healthcare attorneys, anxiety and guilt often cloud their thinking. They may need an insurance company risk manager to help them coolly analyze the situation and rehearse what they'll
tell the patient.
Id.
205. To be fair, determining what is error and what is misfortune can be tricky, particularly in
very sick patients. Bad outcomes do not equal mistakes, and not all mistakes or error in judgments are negligence. It is obviously reasonable for the malpractice carrier to ask the doctor to
investigate before issuing a statement of self-blame.
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they are trying to avoid, since avoidance erodes the doctor-patient relationship and makes the patient more likely to sue."20 6 Obviously,

the picture is complicated. Recent articles, particularly from apology
enthusiasts, have encouraged discourse; even medical malpractice experts concerned about liability have awakened to the potential benefits of an early apology.2 °7 Yet the message is decidedly mixed, with
fear of legal liability a key concern.20 8
Beyond the fear of being sued and potentially liable because of
an apology, doctors are also worried about their ability to participate
in health maintenance organizations, their malpractice premiums, and
other less tangible assets, such as their professional reputations.20 9

Moreover, medical practice hierarchy complicates doctors' reluctance
to disclose errors, especially for young medical residents who make a
disproportional number of the mistakes and may fear reporting mistakes to their attending physicians.210 In fact, doctors are so scared of
liability that they often refuse to issue even a sympathetic apology,

lest that sympathy be mistaken for an admission of fault. 21 1 Legally,
206. Don Colburn, Doctors Should Admit Mistakes, Study Says, CLEV. PLAIN DEALER, Jan.
21, 1997, available in 1997 WL 6575333 (quoting Steven B. Hardin, M.D., assistant professor of
medicine at Loma Linda University Medical School); see also Patient Care: It's Best to Own Up,
MODERN PHYSICIAN, Dec. 1, 1997, available in 1997 WL 15486356 (citing Steven B. Hardin).
207. See Lowes, supra note 192.
208. See Andrew A. Oppenberg, M.P.H., Adverse Outcomes: What Do You Do?, CAL. PI-SICIAN, Feb. 1992, at 44 ("A simple expression of sympathy does not equate an admission of
liability, it shows your true concern for the situation.").
209. In fact, one doctor who issued an apology to the family of a man whose noncancerous
lung he had mistakenly removed, later sued his lawyers for negligence. See Linda P. Campbell,
Trial Opens in Case of Doctor Suing Lawyers for Malpractice, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM,
Mar. 4, 1998, available in 1998 WL 3280407. The doctor argued that his formal written apology
and a videotaped deposition (excerpts from which were aired later on the CBS news broadcast,
48 Hours, see 48 Hours: See You in Court, Lawyers Get Large Malpractice Awards For Families
of Victims (CBS television broadcast, Sept. 14, 1995), available in Lexis, Nexis Library, Scripts
File), were imprudent gestures that no reasonable attorney should have encouraged. See id. The
doctor lost the case. See Linda P. Campbell, Doctor Loses Suit Against Lawyers, FORT WORTH
STAR-TELEGRAPH, Apr. 30, 1998, available in 1998 WL 3292430. See generally Brad Burg, Malpractice: Doctors' Six Fatal Mistakes, MED. ECON., Feb. 12, 1996, at 227 (describing a doctor's
economic and reputational devastation after being sued, even if the claim was bogus).

210. See Lowes, supra note 192 (recounting a healthcare law professor's perceptions after
hearing that young physicians get "cues" from administrators that they should never admit
mistakes).
211. Many attorneys specifically instruct doctors not to apologize, lest the apology be mistaken for an admission of fault. See id. For instance, malpractice defense attorney, Jack E.
Horsley of Mattoon, Ill., advises his doctor clients to lay out the facts, possibly using the "word
'inadvertent' if need be." Id. (quoting Horsley). Horsley further suggests that a doctor
"'shouldn't be apologetic or [have his] hat-in-hand,"' so that "'[t]he patient won't resent the
doctor not saying I'm sorry."' Id. But cf. Larry Veltman, M.D., Managing Bad Results (visited
Mar. 18, 1998) <http://www.ama-assn.org/med-sci/npsf/veltman.html> (discussing what to do in
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of course, an admission of error and an apology for it does not necessarily indicate a doctor's breach of the duty of care, but the doctor's
fear that the patient will not understand this distinction.212 Propagating this fear are the medical legends and cautionary tales that circulate
among doctors.2 13 One malpractice attorney told of a surgeon who
received a letter from a widow asking for information explaining why
her husband had died of a post-operative infection.2 14 The lawyer
recounted:
Without consulting anyone, the surgeon sent a sympathy card. He
wrote on it that he was sorry, the situation was very unusual, and he
had no explanation. To the doctor, that probably seemed kind and
harmless. But to a plaintiff's attorney, it meant, If I had done this
right, he wouldn't have died.215
According to the attorney, the surgeon purportedly agreed to settle
the claim for $50,000, and the other doctors-who all neglected to
send condolence cards-"got off" completely.216 Whether this story is
true, or whether the plaintiff went forward with the lawsuit is not important. Nor is the question whether a condolence card would be admissible; or if it is admissible, whether the jury would hold it against
the doctor. In fact, one might suppose that apologies would humanize
doctors and avoid risking the jury's ire expressed in an award of punitive damages, especially where malpractice is obvious, as with a mistaken amputation. What is important, however, is the widespread
perception that the law punishes apologies.
B.

Reasons for Advocating Apologies

The parties involved and society at large gain significantly when
doctors inform patients and apologize for errors.

the case of an adverse outcome and stating that "it is all right to apologize to the patient for the
occurrence of the event. 'I am very sorry that this happened.' (This does not mean apologize
because you caused the outcome.)"
212. See Rehm & Beatty, supra note 98, at 115; see also supra notes 198-99 and accompanying text.
213. See Burg, supra note 209, at 227 (internal quotations omitted).
214. See id. at 236.
215. Id.
216. Id.
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1. A Doctor's Fiduciary Duties

The doctor-patient relationship is based on trust. 217 Anything
short of full disclosure is a breach of that trust.218 From a perspective
of human dignity, as well as respect for autonomy, doctors must tell
patients what is going on, because most patients have no choice but to
rely on their doctors for expert medical information. Even the symptoms that a patient experiences can derive from many sources, and a
patient without medical training has no way of knowing which may be
due to physician error.21 9 Furthermore, patients may be battling the
physical and psychological problems associated with fighting illness,
rendering them "vulnerable, dependent, and insecure" and more
likely to rely on their doctors.22 °

Given the dynamics of the professional relationship-i.e., the patient pays for the doctor's expertise and relies on the doctor's assumed
mission to heal and advocate for the patient's best interest-it is morally abhorrent for the doctor to fail to disclose vital information

merely for self-protective purposes. 22 ' A feminist analysis of the doc217. See Ann J. Kellett, R.N., Comment, Healing Angry Wounds: The Roles of Apology and
Mediation in Disputes Between Physicians and Patients, 1987 Mo. J. Disp. RESOL. 111, 115 (1987)
("The physician-patient relationship is predicated on trust, and lack of trust can result in poor
outcomes." (citing Sommers, Malpractice Risk and Patient Relations, 20 J. FAM. PRAc. 299
(1985))).
218. The only exception Dr. Wu could envision was in the rare case in which it was not in the
patient's best interest to know the truth. See Wu et al., supra note 180, at 771; see also A. J.
Davis et al., CulturalAspects of Nondisclosure, 3 CAMBRIDGE QTRLY. HEALTHCARE ETHICS 338
(1994) (visited Mar. 18, 1998) <gopher://gopher.mcw.edu:72/0R0-408. . .Filial%20Duty%20of
%20Nondisclosure> (noting that in some cultures full disclosure of distressing medical news,
especially over the objection of the patient's children was harmful to the patient and the family);
cf. Vogel & Delgado, supra note 197, at 83-86 (discussing and refuting the argument that imposing a duty of disclosure may suggest that as a group, doctors are not to be trusted).
219. "Patients, as laypersons, are rarely in a position to determine, unaided, whether a particular injury is the result of their physicians' breaching a medical standard." Kellett, supra note
217, at 123 (citing R. KLEIN, COMPLAINTS AGAINST DOCTORS 50 (1973)).
220. Vogel & Delgado, supra note 197, at 53 n.5 (citing studies on the psychological and
emotional effects of illness on patients). Patients experience "'self estrangement,' because patients experience a loss of control over their bodies and minds." Kellett, supra note 217, at 114
(citing and quoting J. KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT 209 (1984)).

221. See Vogel & Delgado, supra note 197, at 61 n.55 (stating that John Rawls and "[t]he
Golden Rule supports a duty to disclose" mistakes to patients (citing JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY
OF JUSTICE 48-49 (1971)). Some argue that medical professionals should be held to a fiduciary
standard requiring doctors to disclose mistakes and misdeeds. See Gerald Robertson, Fraudulent
Concealment and the Duty to Disclose Medical Mistakes, 25 ALBERTA L. REV. 215, 221-22 (1986)
(arguing that whether or not patients ask for information, physicians must disclose errors to
patients, as an outgrowth of their fiduciary duties and a corollary to their duties of informed
consent; and that the failure to do so is actionable as fraudulent concealment). But cf Aufrichtig
v. Lowell, 650 N.E.2d 401, 405 (N.Y. 1995) (holding a physican liable for violating his "duty of
care not to impart false information" about his patient by misrepresenting his patient's skilled
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tor-patient relationship would be concerned about this imbalance in
knowledge and power, and would insist on honest disclosure as the
first step in making the relationship more equal and connected. The
concern that feminists have with invasion and misuse of female bodies
is also triggered by a concern that doctors may not be offering a full
accounting of the physical actions they perpetrate on women.
2.

Support for the Doctor's Professional Obligations

Related closely to the doctor's fiduciary duties are the doctor's
professional obligations. By disclosing and apologizing, a doctor is
able to fulfill the physician's ethical responsibility of being truthful
and loyal. According to the American College of Physicians Ethics
Manual, doctors should tell patients about errors "'if such information
significantly affects the care of the patient.' "222 Similarly, the American Medical Association's (AMA's) Principlesof Medical Ethics state
that a physician "must report an accident, injury or bad result stemming from his or her treatment. '223 And,
[t]he AMA's Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs states: "Situations occasionally occur in which a patient suffers significant medical complications that may have resulted from the physician's
mistake or judgment. In these situations, the physician is ethically
all facts necessary to ensure underrequired to inform the patient of224
standing of what has occurred.

Furthermore, this duty should not be tempered by the physician's selfinterest. The AMA's Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs provides
that "'[c]oncern regarding legal liability which might result following
nursing needs to her insurance carrier). Vogel & Delgado argue in favor of a duty to disclose

medical mistakes, asserting that it would put additional pressure on medical and governmental
agencies to police doctor behavior and yet would not be as intrusive as the duty imposed on
psychotherapists to warn third parties of a patient's dangerousness. See Vogel & Delgado, supra
note 197, at 72-73 (discussing a psychotherapist's "duty to warn third parties who he or she
believes the patient is likely to harm" (citing Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California,
551 P.2d 334, 347-48 (1976))).
222. Wu et al., supra note 180, at 770 n.6 (quoting AMERICAN COLLEGE OF PHYSICIANS,
AMERICAN COLLEGE OF PHYSICIANS ETHICS MANUAL 117:947-60 (3rd ed. 1992)).
223. Id. at 770 & n.5 (citing AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSN., PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS § 4
(1957)). The first principle set forth in the 1996 edition of the American MedicalAssociation's
Principlesof Medical Ethics is that a "physician shall be dedicated to providing competent medical service with compassion and respect and dignity." American Medical Assn., Principles of
Medical Ethics (visited Sept 17, 1998) <http://www~ama-assn.org/ehtic/pome.html>. The second

principle is that a "physician shall deal honestly with patients and colleagues and strive to expose
those physicians deficient in character or competence, or who engage in fraud or deception." Id.
Arguably, both principles require doctors to inform patients of mistakes in order to improve the
competence of care, and the respect and dignity of their patients.
224. Wu et al., supra note 180, at 770 & n.7 (citations omitted).
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truthful disclosure should not affect the physician's honesty with a
patient.' "225

A lawyer-like reading of the these ethical cannons indicates that
medical ethics do not require disclosure of all mistakes and do not
always specify to whom mistakes must be reported. 2 6 Furthermore,
the resultant harm must be "significant" and tangible, 227 and thus appears limited to physical rather than psychological harms. Many times
doctors feel trapped when they commit errors that cause substantial
harm. As one medical ethicist explains, the question of what to tell
the patient "makes doctors squirm .... Conceal a mistake, and you

violate your professional ethics. Admit a mistake, and you may give a
patient ammo for a malpractice suit. '"228 The benefit of my proposal is
that it disarms the patient sufficiently to encourage a peaceful overture by the physician.
3. Benefits to the Patient and the Patient's Family
On a purely practical level, the patient may need disclosure in

order to receive prompt and appropriate treatment to remedy the
doctor's error.22 9 A patient will be more likely to follow through with
225. Id. at 774 (citation omitted).
226. Many have raised serious questions whether doctors are sufficiently committed to enforcing these professional standards. "Traditionally, state medical boards have been reluctant to
address physician incompetence." See, e.g., Frank A. Sloan et al., Medical Malpractice Experience of Physicians: Predictableor Haphazard?,262 JAMA 3291, 3297 & n.ll (1989) (citing R.P.
Krusserow et al., An Overview of State Medical Discipline, 257 JAMA 820, 820-24 (1987)); see
also Vogel & Delgado, supra note 197, at 58-60 & n.41 (discussing the medical profession's ineffective self-regulation stating that "'the profession's advice to its members on minimization of
legal liability often seems to proceed from the premise that the objective should be ... to...
forestall lawsuits, and the secondary objective [should be] .. .to reduce bad medical malpractice."' (quoting 1 D. LoUSISELL & H. WILLIAMS, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 6.02 (1977 & Supp.
1979))); Kristina Brenneman, State Seen Too Easy on Doctors,PATRIOT LEDGER, Apr. 13, 1998,
available in 1998 WL 8083139; Brian C. Mooney, The Patients Left Behind: Doctors with Dubious Records Start Fresh in Other States, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 5, 1994, available in 1994 WL
6003943 (detailing horrific and repeated negligence by doctors, who the medical community continued to protect and made secret settlements without ever admitting fault). Increasingly, doctors have been criminally charged for their medical mistakes-arguably a sign of the growing
frustration with the medical profession's failure to self-regulate. See, e.g., Maura Dolan, Judge
Acquits Rural Doctor of Murder of Infant Patient, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 21, 1998, at Al ("Medical
associations complain that in recent years prosecutors have begun charging physicians criminally
for medical errors.").
227. See Wu et al., supra note 180, at 771 ("We argue that the physician has an obligation to
disclose mistakes that cause significant harm.").
228. Lowes, supra note 192.
229. Examples include: post-operative care for potential complications arising out of a punctured stomach, or counseling for a patient whose sterilization operation was unsuccessful. See
Vogel & Delgado, supra note 197, at 62; Robertson, supra note 221, at 215.
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treatments if she understands why they are necessary. Even when remedial medical procedures are unnecessary, monitoring may be
needed. In either case, the physician needs to inform the patient to
assure full cooperation and receive informed consent.23 °
Of equal importance to the ethical, legal, and practical benefits,
disclosure may often assist the patient psychologically. For example, a
patient would not despair if her recuperation after surgery was slowed
by physician error, but instead would see the problem for what it is, a
temporary setback. 231' Disclosure of this information allays anxiety
and forestalls discouragement.
A doctor's apology can be healing in a spiritual sense as well.
The patient feels not only more secure in her ultimate recovery, but
more secure that someone is truly caring for her and that she will receive straight answers and caring treatment. Even if the patient died,
her family would have a sense that their loved one mattered to the
doctor and to the medical establishment that accidently killed her.
A physician's withdrawal and retreat into silence after a tragic
error can be maddening. Not understanding the loss of a loved one
adds to the family's suffering. The father of Denise Verbeeck, an
otherwise healthy twenty-seven-year-old who inexplicably deteriorated after a purportedly successful knee surgery, explained his frustration about receiving bills from the hospital, but no apology. 232 Mr.
Verbeeck stated: "'People talk about the blue wall of silence. The
233
hospital has a white wall of silence,... [a]nd this is life and death.' ,,
The father demanded a full explanation and wanted the state to root
out such failures in patient care.23 4 Similarly, a distraught mother
who sued a doctor after he made a surgical error that killed her child
explained: "'It isn't the money ...

.'

The hospital has already agreed

to settle for $150,000 [the legal limit of medical malpractice liability in
Wisconsin]. 'I want my day in court. I want to hear them tell me what
went wrong. I want to hear them admit guilt and tell me they're
230. See Wu et al., supra note 180, at 771.
231. As Dr. Wu explains:
Disclosure of a mistake may also prevent the patient from worrying needlessly about
the etiology of a medical problem. For example, a patient who was prescribed too
much warfarin resulting in excessive anticoagulation suffered a gastrointestinal bleed.
Telling patients about such mistakes may resolve their uncertainty about the cause of
their condition, possibly allowing them to feel better by explaining that recurrence
would be unlikely.
Id.
232. See Roni Rabin, Wondering Why, NEWSDAY, Aug. 11, 1995, at A7.
233. Id.
234. See id.
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sorry."' 2 35 The mother's need for explanation and disclosure was
poignant. Interestingly, she also needed some assurance that her child
mattered to the doctor, and that her child's death altered the emotional and moral balance of the doctor's world.
In another example, a Philadelphia malpractice defense lawyer
recounted a case in which an infant girl died in the hospital because
she received the wrong kind of infant formula.2 36 At the deposition,
'
months after her death, her father "was a basket case." 237
"It was obvious he had no idea why his daughter died. The nurses
hadn't talked to him. The doctors had ducked into the elevator. I
went off the record with the man, and he tearfully said, 'I didn't file
this lawsuit over money. I filed to find out what happened to my
daughter.' Once he uncovered the facts, and once the hospital took
of mistake from happening again, the
steps to prevent that 'kind
238
man dropped his suit.
For one final example of the desperate need that patients and
their families have for explanations and apologies, we can look to the
hearings on a proposed settlement for harm caused by Cold War radiation experiments performed at the former Cincinnati General Hospital. 239 Doctors in the study testified that they gave patients whole
body radiation treatments to relieve cancer pain.24' But critics contend that the study was designed "to provide the military with information on how a nuclear attack might affect troops. "241 A woman
who watched her mother decline severely after receiving the whole
body radiation treatment described her mother's burned body, weakened condition, and immense pain from the procedure. 24 2 She scoffed
at the proposed settlement, which would have included money, hanging a plaque inscribed with each patients' initials somewhere on the
University of Cincinnati campus, and an apology from the federal government.24 3 The use of the patients' initials was proposed to appease
some researchers that were concerned that if the plaque fully identified the names of those who received the radiation, it "would be a blot
235. Flaherty, supra note 189 (quoting Barb Schultz, whose thirteen-year-old daughter died
from a punctured artery six hours after a routine appendectomy).
236. See Lowes, supra note 192.
237. Id.
238. Id. (quoting statement of James Lewis Griffith).
239. See Tim Bonfield, Holdouts Call Deal Far From Adequate, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Feb.
22, 1997, available in 1997 WL 5438066.
240. See id.
241. Id.
242. See id.

243. See id.
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on their professional careers."' 2 "4 One family member asserted: "My
mother had a name. Her name was Maude Jacobs. What is this about
initials? This is not about money. My greatest goal would be to see
those doctors up in front of the court .... I want the doctors to admit
24 5
they made a mistake.
Disclosure alone is not enough to heal the breach caused by a
medical error.2 46 Information alone, though useful, is more meaning-

ful and more acceptable if offered in the context of remorse and regret. From a strictly physical vantage point, disclosure may remedy
the potential physical harm and address classic legal concerns with autonomy. But a feminist approach to the relationship, recognizing that
the harm done by a doctor's error affects a vital connection between
doctor and patient, demands more. The patient needs to know that
the doctor is sorry because that validates the relationship and the significance of the patient. Apologies, because they are personal and
emotional, provide a remedy that traditional tort law simply cannot
provide.2 4 7

This concern to know the facts, receive an apology, and the assurance that the loved one mattered to the doctors and the medical establishment, is also accompanied by the desire to make sure such
tragedies do not happen again. In the largest sense, the concern that
the error not be repeated reflects an ethic of care for the entire community. The motive strikes me not so much as punitive regarding the
doctors, but purposeful-stemming from a desire to make some sense
out of tragic and unnecessary loss, and a hope that the lessons from a
loved one's death will spare others. Obviously, if the doctors stonewall and pretend nothing untoward took place, the family is deprived
of its need to make sense of the tragedy and express its grief through
positive action.

244. Id.
245. Id.
246. See David Hilfiker, M.D., Facing Our Mistakes, 310 NEw ENG. J. MED. 118,121 (1984)
(distinguishing between informing patients of mistakes by giving the patient or family a clinical
description of what happened and truly confessing by saying "This is the mistake I made; I'm
sorry").
247. Cf. Levi, supra note 137, at 1206 (referring to Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another
View of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of Problem Solving, 31 UCLA L. REV. 754, 795-96
(1984).
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Benefits to the Doctor

a. Expiating Guilt

Negligent treatment is highly stressful for professional healerswhose primary creed since the days of Hippocrates has been "to keep
the sick from harm and injustice."24 Making a mistake, particularly
one that takes a life, is excruciating for doctors. Dr. John Lantos de-

scribed how mistakes have "come back to haunt [him] late at
night."24 9 He acknowledged that "[s]ometimes, patients have died as

a result of my mistakes. Other times, my mistakes have increased
their suffering."250 Similarly, in a very moving article entitled Facing
Our Mistakes, Dr. David Hilfiker offers a harrowing account of personal medical mistakes, including an abortion of a fetus (who was
deeply desired by his parents), because Dr. Hilfiker mistakenly believed that the fetus had died in utero.251 Dr. Hilfiker discussed his
agony about the mistake, which he disclosed to the parents and for
which they did not sue.252 Dr. Hilfiker noted that many aspects of
medical culture prevent doctors from acknowledging and addressing
errors; most prominently, "an atmosphere of denial is created: the
'good physician' doesn't make mistakes.

'25 3

Even when the bravado

of the perfection is dropped, doctors generally do not discuss the per248. Hippocratic Oath, reprinted in JOHN D. ARRAS & NANCY K. RHODEN, ETHICAL ISSUES
IN MODERN MEDICINE 48 (3d ed. 1989).

249. John Lantos, M.D., Should Doctors Tell the Truth? One Physician'sPrescriptionfor One
of Medicine's Lingering Ailments, CHI. TRIB., May 4, 1997, (Magazine), available in 1997 WL
3545492.
250. Id. Dr. Lantos described holding "court in [his] mind, replaying events, wondering
whether they were honest mistakes, forgivable mistakes, or, if not, how [he] can go on." Id.
251. See Hilfiker, supra note 246, at 118-19.
252. See id.
253. Id. at 121. Dr. Hilfiker observed that "[plainfully, almost unbelievably, we physicians
are even less prepared to deal with our mistakes than the average lay person is. The climate of
medical school and residency training, for instance, makes it nearly impossible to confront the
emotional consequences of mistakes." Id.
Many have noted the impediments to apology inherent in medical culture and the doctorpatient relationship. See generally Kellett, supra note 217. A big part of the problem is that
"[platients, and the public in general, maintain an image of physicians that includes a 'myth of
medical perfection."' Id. at 114 (quoting Press, The Predispositionto File Claims: The Patient's
Perspective, 12 L. MED. & HEALTH CARE 53, 55 (1984)). "High technology and 'medical miracles' make the idea of error intolerable[,] . . . [especially when] [tielevision programming
presents an image of the selfless, warm, sensitive and perfect physician." Id. at 114-15 (quoting
Press, supra, at 55). As technology improves and specialization increases, doctors tend to focus
more on body parts than on the whole person. See id. at 117. This fits into the larger "clash of
physician's and patient's culture[s]," id. at 120, where patients present feelings of illness and a
need to be made whole, and "'clinical medicine looks exclusively for disease.,"' id. at 116 & n.40
(quoting Press, supra, at 56). Furthermore, the dynamic between doctor and patient is complex.
The patient both wants to be childlike and relieved of all responsibility, which collides with the
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sonal aspects of their catastrophic mistakes. 254 Doctors need to find a
solution to the emotional and spiritual traumas of making mistakes.
Dr. Hilfiker advocates that
[a]t some point we must bring our mistakes out of the closet. We
need to give ourselves permission to recognize our errors and their
consequences. We need to find healthy ways to deal with our emotional responses to those errors. Our profession is 255
difficult enough
perfection.
of
yoke
the
wear
to
having
our
without

In a survey, "physicians reported that sharing errors with colleagues, students, friends, and sometimes patients prevented isolation,
and marked the beginning of grieving about and learning from the
mistake. 2 5 6 Only by apologizing, however, can the doctor expiate her
guilt. 257 Dr. Wu astutely noted that when the doctor makes a serious

error, "the patient or family member may be the only person able to
258
forgive the physician.
b. Disclosure as a Means of Avoiding Litigation

Disclosure is not only the right thing to do, it is often the smart
thing to do. It should come as no surprise that there is considerable
medical literature devoted to how doctors can avoid getting sued. 5 9
Given the vast amount of medical negligence that occurs, it is clear
that most patients who are victims of malpractice do not sue.2 60 Furadult desire and need "'to be informed, heard, and consulted."' Id. at 121 & n.81 (quoting J.
KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT 207 (1984)).
254. Dr. Hilfiker noted that he could not "remember a single instance in which another physician initiated a discussion of a mistake for the purpose of clarifying his or her own emotional
response or deciding how to follow up." Hilfiker, supra note 246, at 121. Dr. Hilfiker noted that
although doctors "discuss difficult cases or unfortunate results ... these discussions are always
handled so delicately in the presence of the 'offending' physician that there is simply no space for
confession or absolution." Id. at 121.
255. Id. at 122.
256. Wu et al., supra note 180, at 772 & n.19 (citing The Quill-Williamson PR, Health Approaches to Physician Stress, 150 ARCHIVES OF INTERNAL MED. 1857-61 (1990)).

257. See Veltman, supra note 211. ("The physician may have feelings of guilt, worry about
litigation, and often experiences great stress while dealing with the patient's situation.").
258. Wu et al., supra note 180, at 772.
259. See generally, e.g., Gerald B. Hickson et al., Development of an Early Identification and
Response Model of Malpractice Prevention, 60 L. & CONTEMPORARY PROBS. 7 (1997) (describ-

ing techinques to head off medical malpractice claims before they are filed).
260. As researchers in the New England Journal of Medicine explain, "medical-malpractice
claims are rarely made after patients are injured negligently." Troyen A. Brennan, M.D., J.D.,
M.P.H. et al., Relation Between Negligent Adverse Events and the Outcomes of Medical-Malpractice Litigation, 335 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1963, 1963 (1996). Medical negligence is more prevalent

than the actual number of claims filed. See generally Goldman, supra note 186. Of those patients who have a legitimate claim against their doctors, "only a small fraction" (one in 50)
pursue legal action. Id. When the patients did sue, there seemed to be distinct problems in the
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thermore, the patterns of suits do not correlate with standard measures of technical competence.2 6 1 In fact, "the initiation of malpractice
suits correlates poorly with the actual occurrence of adverse
events.

2 62

So, what is predictive of a patient's decision to sue? Interestingly,
studies reviewing medical records indicate that the decision of a patient to sue rests less on the quality of care than on the treatment by
the doctor. There is general agreement that communication problems
are a key factor. One study found that physicians' failure to communicate and "affronts to patients' values" correlated significantly with
patients' decisions to consult lawyers about perceived problems in
their care.2 63 "Doctors who ignore their patients or are otherwise
rude to them have a way of showing up in malpractice suits. ' 264 Similarly, malpractice attorneys report that more than eighty percent of
doctor-patient relationship. See id. Specifically, one study found that in approximately 70% of
cases where a patient sued a doctor, the physician was characterized by the patient "as not
caring, or delivering the news in a dysfunctional way, or not keeping people up to date, or abandoning the family or the patient." Id.
261. See Sloan et al., supra note 226, at 3295-96 (finding few relationships between number
of claims for malpractice and supposed indications of quality, "such as board-certification status,
prestige of medical school attended, and country of medical school").
262. Brennan et al., supra note 260, at 1963. Furthermore "the severity of the patient's disability, not the occurrence of an adverse event or an adverse event due to negligence, was predictive of payment to the plaintiff." Id.
263. Kellett, supra note 217, at 123 (citing M. MAY & L. DEMARCO, PATIENTS AND DocTORS DISPUTING:

PATIENTS' COMPLAINTS AND WHAT THEY

Do ABOUT THEM 24 (1986) (pub-

lished by the Institute for Legal Studies as DISPUTE PROCESSING RESEARCH PROGRAMWORKING PAPERS SERIES 7).
"The doctor who wants to get in trouble after an incident of actual malpractice can do
so easily. All he has to do is avoid the patient, blame the patient for the bad result,
refuse to talk to the family, refuse to apologize, refuse to listen in humility to patient
castigation, and then to send his bill as usual."

Id. at 124 (quoting R. BLUM,
(1960)).

THE MANAGEMENT OF THE DOCTOR-PATIENT RELATIONSHIP

253

264. Goldman, supra note 186. As an editorial in the Journal of the American Medical Association explained: "Breakdowns in communication between patients and physicians and patient
dissatisfaction are critical factors leading to malpractice litigation." Wendy Levinson, M.D., Editorial, Physician-PatientCommunication: A Key to Malpractice Prevention, 272 JAMA 1619,
1619 (1994). There are "four types of communication problems: deserting the patient, devaluing
patients' views, delivering information poorly, and failing to understand patients' perspectives."
Id. In investigating the experiences of how physicians with high claims differ from those with
average or no malpractice claims, the research revealed that "[pihysicians who have been sued
frequently are more often the objects of complaints about the interpersonal care they provide
even by their patients who do not sue" and concluded that "the frequency with which physicians
are sued is related in part to patients' satisfaction with interpersonal aspects of medical care."
Gerald B. Hickson et al., Obstetrician'sPriorMalpractice Experiences and Patients' Satisfaction
with Care, 272 JAMA 1583, 1583, 1586 (1994).
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malpractice actions are pursued by patients with some form of communication complaint.265
Indeed, medical literature has recently begun to emphasize the
importance of training in good communication skills and expressions
of care for the patient. As a general matter, a doctor who cultivates
the skills of honest and open communication and respect for patients
is less likely to be sued.266 In a study comparing the communication
styles of doctors who had been sued and those who had not, those
doctors who used humor and spent more time with their patients were
much less likely to be sued for malpractice.267 Conversely, doctors
who ignored their patients or were rude to them were often defendants in malpractice suits. Indeed, in a recent survey, ninety-eight percent of patients polled want their doctors to disclose mistakes, no
matter how
minor, and many said they would not sue if the doctors
8
26
did so.

In fact, as a result of recent research, primary care practitioners
have been advised to improve their communication with patientsproviding "longer office visits, more personal attention and more
265. See Levinson, supra note 264, at 1619 (suggesting that "35% were due to physician attitudes ....35% were due to failure in communication, 7% were due to physician disparagement
of previous care, and 5% were due to unrealistic patient expectation").
266. See Hey Doc, Let's Talk!, PEOPLE'S MED. Soc'y., (Peoples' Medical Society, Inc.), Aug.
1, 1997, available in 1997 WL 10116546 [hereinafter referred to as Hey Doc] ("Communication
between doctors and patients not only has a direct effect on consumer understanding; it also has
a direct effect on consumer behavior-including whether or not the consumer will file a malpractice suit."). The issue of patient communication and honest dialogue is particularly acute with
the advent of health maintenance organizations, which not only invade the doctor-patient relationship by limiting and dictating care, but also forbid doctors in some cases from discussing
certain treatment options with patients. See David R. Olmos & Sharon Roan, HMO 'Gag
Clauses' on Doctors Spur Protest, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 14, 1996, at Al.
267. See Time and Humor Help Shield Physicians From Lawsuits, MED. PRACrICE COMMUNICATOR (visited Oct. 29, 1998) <http://www.medscape.com/HMI/MPCommunicator/1988/
v05.n02/mpcO5O2.14.html>. In discussing the work of Wendy Levinson, M.D., this article noted
that
[o]f the physicians who were studied, those who had never faced a malpractice suit
spent an average of 18 minutes with the patients. The physicians who had faced a
malpractice suit spent an average of 15 minutes with their patients. The PCPs who had
not faced suits also used more humor and laughed more, were more careful to explain
what they were going to do before they did it, and encouraged patients to talk.
Id. Furthermore, "'Clinicians who communicate well with patients will see several benefits including increased patient satisfaction, better patient outcomes, increased physician satisfaction,
and reduced malpractice risk,' said J. Gregory Carroll, Ph.D., [D]irector, Bayer Institute." Id.
268. See Denise Mann, Disclosing Errors Could Lower Risk of Lawsuits, MED. TRIB. (visited
Feb. 3, 1999) <http://webl.po.com/html.med trib/archiveIFPIPAGE1A.FP.shtml> (reporting on
an Archives of InternalMedicine study stating that 60% would sue if told of a "severe mistake"
compared to 76% if they discovered the mistake themselves; only 12% would sue if told of a
"moderate mistake," compared to 20% if they discovered the mistake themselves).
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feedback and more humor"-as a means of avoiding malpractice
claims in the future.2 6 9 Certainly anecdotal evidence indicates that
such treatment positively predisposes patients to their doctors
and in270
creases the likelihood that they will accept an apology.

A doctor who is caught in a lie or fails to disclose a mistake is
particularly vulnerable. 27' Even in cases of severe, life-threatening errors (such as failure to detect a spreading cancer), only sixty percent

of hypothetical patients polled said that they would sue for malpractice if informed by the doctor of the error, as opposed to seventy-six
percent who said that they would sue if they discovered the error on
their own.2 72

Therefore, doctors should disclose errors and arguably apologize
to avoid legal risks. An apology by a professional may forestall a lawsuit. 273 The apology may not be a substitute for monetary compensation, but it would enhance the exchange of information and establish
269. Hey Doc, supra note 266.

270. Although there is always a danger in relying on anecdote, I feel justified in doing so
because I believe that is how doctors learn not to apologize-by hearing horror stories and
suburban legends of lawsuits against nice-guy doctors. See supra notes 252-53 and accompanying
text. Dr. Stephen McPhee, a colleague of Dr. Wu, tells the story that he once erred in failing to
order a blood test, and hence, delayed diagnosing a disease for which prompt treatment was
critical. See Denise Grady, Doctors Urged to Admit Mistakes, N.Y. TiMEs, Dec. 9, 1997, at F9.
The patient was a lawyer, and Dr. McPhee was fearful of a lawsuit. See id. McPhee found that
after an honest discussion and apology, his patient was understanding and forgiving. See id.
271. Dr. Gerald B. Hickson reported that 24% of the patients filed claims "when they realized that [their doctors] had failed to be completely honest with them about what happened,
allowed them to believe things that were not true, or intentionally misled them." Gerald B.
Hickson, M.D. et al., FactorsThat PromptedFamilies to File Medical Malpractice Claims Follow-

ing PerinatalInjuries, 267 JAMA 1359, 1359 (1992) (involving a study of patients who actually
filed lawsuits). As an example, Dr. Hickson quotes one patient who stated that a pediatrician
told her and her husband "that one twin had cerebral palsy. He looked at files from [the] hospital and found that the records [had been] altered." Id. Certainly, if the patient will readily
discover the medical error (e.g., if the wrong leg is amputated), it is better that they hear it from
the doctor directly. See Mann, supra note 268 (finding that when doctors do acknowledge their
mistakes, patients would be less likely to sue for malpractice than if they had uncovered the
error on their own). Dr. Wu has similarly argued that patients with whom doctors have good
relationships "wouldn't think of suing." Wu et al., supra note 180, at 772. But people who feel
their trust has been violated feel betrayed, and a lawsuit may seem like the only way to get to the
truth. See id. at 771. Any cover-up would probably just toll the statute of limitations. See
Lowes, supra note 192.
272. See id. (discussing a study in the Archives of Internal Medicine, 156:2565 (1996)). The

study involved questionnaires sent to 400 patients, 149 of whom responded. See Mann, supra
note 268. For less serious mistakes such as a minor stroke followed by full recovery, 12%
claimed that they would sue their doctor if their doctor informed them of the mistake, as opposed to 20% who would sue if they discovered the mistake themselves. See id.
273. As Pam Lockowitz, president of MMI Risk Management Resources, explained: "We've
seen that patients frequently file
suits because they didn't get the whole truth from their doctor."
Lowes, supra note 192.
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an atmosphere of trust, humanity, and compassion in which the parties could determine the cost
of remedying the malpractice, without
274
acrimony, delay, or guilt.
5. Benefits to Society
Significantly, the benefits of apology do not adhere to the parties
alone. Society as a whole benefits from doctors' disclosures and apologies. But apologies address only some of the systemic failures in the
current malpractice scheme.275 Serious debates rage as to whether a
malpractice "crisis" exists (which usually refers to the suing of doctors,
not their negligent treatment of patients).2 76 Given the high levels of
negligence and the low level of law suits, society certainly has no assurance that malpractice is weeding out technically inferior doctors,
particularly because communication skills, rather than medical competence, seem to affect who gets sued.27 7

Doctors can learn from their mistakes to become better physicians and better healers.2 78 Discussing mistakes also removes some of
the pressure to appear perfect. 279 Such disclosure would promote
274. See Wu et al., supra note 180, at 771 & n.8 ("In the case of an injury, knowing about a
mistake may allow the patient to obtain compensation for lost earnings or to pay for care necessitated by the injury, or to at least get a bill written off." (citation omitted)). But cf.Billy Wong
Wai-Yuk, Ombudsman Plans Payouts for Blunders, SOUTH CHINA MORN. POST, Jan. 12, 1998,
available in 1998 WL 2963707 (stating that "an apology to the complainant, no matter how gracious it is, does not seem enough for serious malpractice").
275. See Kellett, supra note 217, at 125 (noting that the traditional malpractice litigation
system, as a dispute resolution process "fails to address the emotional injuries of patients," "inflicts emotional injuries on physicians," and does not deter physician incompetence); see also
Metzloff, supra note 186, at 1177. In a book review of Paul C. Weiler's 1991 book, Understanding the Malpractice Wars, Metzloff comments that the central theme is that "as reliable system of
compensation for negligently-injured patients, the malpractice litigation process fails." Id. Weiler asserts that "it overcompensates those with minor injuries and seriously under-compensates
those with major injuries." Id. at 1185. From a societal vantage point, one of the basic functions
of malpractice law-deterrence-is rarely accomplished by our lottery-like system in which one
patient wins big, but most get nothing. Furthermore, physicians are insulated from personal
liability by insurance coverage, and historically are rarely disciplined as a result of malpractice
actions. See Thomas B. Metzloff & Frank A. Sloan, Forward: Medical Malpractice: External
Influence, and Controls, 60 L. & CONTEMPORARY PROBS. 1, 2 (1997).
276. See Kellett, supra note 217, at 111-12 (questioning the existence of a "crisis" in medical
malpractice). See generally Metzloff, supra note 186 (discussing the politics of the debate on
medical malpractice law and the litigation explosion vel non).
277. See supra notes 259-65 and accompanying text.
278. See Wu et al., supra note 180, at 772.
279. See, e.g., Eugene Guazzo, M.D., Archives of Family Medicine: The EmotionalImpact of
Mistakes on Family Physicians (visited Sept. 21, 1998) <http://www.ama-assn.org/sci-pubs/ournals/archive/fami/vol_5/no_9/letter_2.html>. Dr. Guazzo points out that concern about malpractice has made doctors less likely to admit mistakes and has negatively affected the practice of
medicine. See id. The threat of suit "is the reason that we feel so constrained with one another
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general trust in doctors, 8 ° which would lead patients to consult doctors sooner and to earlier detections of problems. If indeed disclosure
leads to an atmosphere of trust between doctor and patient and arguably fewer malpractice suits, then doctors would not need to engage in
defensive medicine, be overly pessimistic, cautious, or create vast paper trails.2 81 To the extent that the malpractice explosion has had an

effect on doctors' willingness to practice in certain high risk areas,
such as obstetrics, an apology exception would promote dialogue and
allow doctors to express regret for the births of less-than-perfect infants, without worrying that in doing so they have created evidence
that could be used against them in future malpractice actions. 82
6.

Arguments Against Disclosure

Certainly, nay-sayers will find the advocacy of disclosure and
apology naive and dangerous. One doctor, who generally favors disclosure observed, "[d]isclosure isn't always benign. Forgiveness is not
automatic."28' 3 The same New York Times article that discussed Dr.

Wu's work, which encourages doctors to disclose their mistakes, also
quoted the communication director of the Physicians Insurers Associ-

ation of America who claimed that asking doctors to admit error and
apologize is tantamount to "asking them to commit professional suicide. 12 84 Although Dr. Nancy Dickey, President of the American
Medical Association, agreed that doctors should disclose mistakes, she

cautioned:
The problem is that the climate of blame in this country, fueled by
the litigation process, where we have to identify someone at fault
who will then pay exorbitantly, makes it difficult to walk out and
finger yourself ....If you do, you're playing roulette. The patient
may say, 'Gee, doc, thanks, that took great courage and I won't take
about our mistakes, and the pity is we then have lost opportunities to learn from them and to
help one another and, ultimately, our patients." Id.
280. See Wu et al., supra note 180, at 771 ("Finally, disclosure of a mistake can promote trust
in physicians. Patients have a presumption of truth-telling. Thus, a patient who is not informed
of a mistake may feel angry and betrayed; the patient may think that a privileged relationship
has been violated.").
281. See Lantos, M.D., supra note 249 ("Clearly, malpractice suits change doctors' behavior.
A publicized judgement [sic] in a particular case will lead doctors to perform clinical interventions that will create a paper trail that will satisfy only the malpractice attorneys.").
282. See generally Laurel Brubaker Calkins, Who'll Deliver the Babies?, Hous. Bus. J., July,
24, 1989, available in 1989 WL 2547489 (discussing the roles of malpractice and high insurance
rates on doctors' exodus from obstetrics).
283. Lantos, supra note 249, at 12.
284. Grady, supra note 181. Another insurance provider explained: "If you have a doctor
out there saying, 'Oh I did it,' it's a little hard for those of us who write the insurance." Id.
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you to court.' But even if the patient feels thai way, there will be
others, family members
and lawyers, who may encourage patients to
2 85
change their minds.
Interestingly, Mark Hatlie, a lawyer and Executive Director of the
National Patient Safety Foundation, a group founded by the American Medical Association, specifically cited the rules of evidence in acknowledging that truth and apology can help a patient and the
patient's family by defusing anger and polarization. 286 But then he
cautioned: "[E]very word you utter is an admission that can be used
' 287
against you in a court of law."
7. Examples and Inspirations
The benefit of apology is best illustrated by the rare examples of
public apologies that I was able to find. A hospital in British Columbia apologized for the death of a little girl who had been treated for
leukemia because of a medication error.288 In a voice cracking with
emotion, the hospital president begged the family's forgiveness:
"There are no words that can adequately communicate our apologies
or regret to this girl's family ....

There is nothing we can do to bring

289
their child back to them and we are devastated by that knowledge.
The hospital president noted that the doctor, who had been practicing
medicine for more than ten years and teaching advanced pediatric oncology, also apologized to the family and reported the incident to the
medical and supervisory authorities.29 ° The doctor was so shaken by
the error that he stopped treating patients, but continues to work on
research. 291 The hospital president promised: "We commit to [the
family] and to British Columbians that we will do everything in our
power to learn from this error so that such a tragedy never occurs

again ....
2

We must do better and honour the memory of this little

girl." 29
Similarly, the President of Irish Blood Transfusion Service Board,
which had provided blood tainted with hepatitis C, issued an apology:
"I do not think words are adequate to express the level of regret and

285. Id. (quoting Dr. Dickey).
286. See Grady, supra note 270.
287. Id.
288. See Injection of Wrong Medication Kills Girl: 'We Must Do Better,' Hospital President
Says, GLOBE & MAIL (Canada), June 6, 1997, at A8.
289. Id.
290. See id.
291. See id.
292. Id.
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sorrow, and I accept that, but nevertheless I believe that the beginning
is to express in words, and I think the follow-up is to try and match it
with actions, which, I hope,.has been done ....

,"293 The blood bank

made serious changes in personnel and management structure, admitting that "human error," "misjudgment," and "complacency" all contributed to the "terrible tragedy. '94
These two apologies have a number of things in common, not the
least of which is that neither was made in the United States.295 Both
explained what went wrong and took responsibility. Both recognized
the victims as significant individuals with legitimate grievances. Both
promised that the suffering of the injured party would not be for
naught because changes would be made to prevent similar future
harm to others. Interestingly, both disparaged the ability of language
to convey their deep emotions.
What should an apology look like? Dr. Wu counsels that "the
physician should begin by stating simply that he or she has made a
mistake" and describe in nontechnical terms that a layperson can understand "the decisions that were made, including those in which the
patient participated. 2 96 "[T]he physician should then express personal regret and apologize for the mistake. ' 29 7 Then the doctor
"should elicit questions or concerns from the patient and address
them. ' 298 I would add that it is important to document the steps the
doctor or institution has taken to prevent such errors in the future. If
preparations can be made (such as free follow-up care or forgiveness
of past bills), the doctor should assure the patient or the patient's family that these costs will be covered. The doctor should go to heroic
lengths to make sure that a negligently treated patient, or worse yet, a
bereaved family, does not receive a bill in the mail.
293. Eibhir Mulqueen, Apology Is Only The Beginning, Says Counsel For BTSB,
TIMES, Feb. 5, 1997, available in 1997 WL 7370176.

IRISH

294. Id.
295. The counsel against apologizing seem particular to the United States. In England, for
instance, Dr. Christine Tomkins, Director of Professional Services for the Medical Defence
Union, Ltd., the United Kingdom's leading provider of physician indemnity, wrote in a letter to
the editor of the London Times that: "A sincere and honest apology should be made, either by
the doctor concerned or, if appropriate, by a senior colleague. Most instances of patient dissatisfaction never develop into a complaint or claim because the doctor gives an immediate explanation or a courteous apology." Letters to the Editor: Saying Sorry, TIMES (London), Jan. 4, 1997,
at 17.
296. Wu et al., supra note 180, at 773.
297. Id.
298. Id.
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Although informing patients of errors may be good medical practice, there are cases in which an apology triggered a lawsuit, and the
patient identified the apology as a significant event in prompting the
suit. 299 The hardest cases for doctors will arise when the negligence is
not obvious, and apology may elicit anger and trigger a lawsuit. My
proposal cannot make it in the doctor's economic best interest to disclose mistakes; it just makes such disclosure less hazardous and facilitates good medical practice without the specter of the apology being
used against her.
Undoubtedly, there will be times when, because of the patient's
condition, the doctor's negligence is not easily detectable. The question of disclosure is presented most starkly for the doctor when the
doctor believes that she might get away with non-disclosure-such as
where a fatal error mimicked a death from natural causes. Another
factor that makes disclosure and apology difficult is that the doctor
may be rightfully concerned about how the patient will react. These
are moral issues for the doctor, which reflect deep social and anthropological questions about the nature of professional relationships and
the roles of honesty and self-interest in daily life. Given all the arguments above for respecting patients, including a doctor's professional
mandates to disclose, I believe doctors should inform patients of mistakes and apologize even if they think that they would not get caught,
and even if they are certain that family members will indeed sue if
they learn of the error. My proposal, however, does not coerce that
result. Instead, my proposal allows doctors to do the right thing.
Often disclosure is wise because the error is obvious (removal of the
non-cancerous lung comes to mind) or because the patient is forgiving. Even when it is adverse to the doctor's "interests" as our society
narrowly defines them, such an apology may be worth the risk. My
proposal facilitates the doctor's moral behavior by removing the impediment of fear of making a statement admissible against him in
299. See, e.g., Sutton v. Calhoun, 593 F.2d 127, 127 (10th Cir. 1979) ("The basis for [plaintiff's] contention [of negligence] comes from the testimony of several members of the plaintiff's
family that after the operation defendant came to them and said he had 'made a mistake,' that
he should not have cut the common bile duct"); Collins v. Baron, 450 N.E.2d 626, 627 (Mass.
App. Ct. 1983) (where plaintiffs sued in part based on an apology in which the doctor said: "I'm
going to transfer you to a hospital in Boston .... I made a mistake during the hysterectomy. I
severed your ureter. It's all my fault. I'm very sorry this happened. I'm going to send you to a
fine hospital for corrective surgery."); cf. Senesac v. Associates in Obstetrics and Gynecology,
449 A.2d 900, 903 (Vt. 1982) (holding that doctor who said that "she 'made a mistake, that she
was sorry, and that it [the perforation of the uterus] had never happened before' does not [without medical testimony] establish a departure from the standard of care ordinarily exercised by a
reasonably skillful gynecologist").
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court. At the very least, the doctor would not be affirmatively punished for doing the right thing.
VI.

CONCLUSION

My suggestions for a new exception to the evidentiary admissions
rule for apologies are derived primarily from feminist insights. The
true benefit of apologies stems from their effect on relationships and
the hierarchical reordering that transpires when regret and forgiveness are exchanged. In the case of medical errors, apologies are healing in the fullest sense, recalibrating the power dynamics between
doctor and patient and nurturing the relationship. In addition to
sparking interests in apologies, I hope I have illustrated how feminist
thought can contribute to scholarly inquiry by providing insights into
the assumptions underlying the evidence rules and offering guidance
on how to improve them.

